The 2016 local government
elections have come and gone. The results have been released by what is
arguably the most efficient elections management agency in the developing world,
the IEC. Political analysts and statisticians are now grappling with the
implications of the numbers and how these are reflective of the continuing
South African story. In this forest of opinions, consensus on the fact that the
country’s democracy is maturing has emerged. Critical in understanding this
consensus will be what areas are being consolidated for the current growth
path.
The South African Constitution, a
growing arbiter for all matters political, provides that the country is one,
sovereign, and democratic state founded on inter alia the values of universal
adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll and a multi-party system of
democratic governance. These values are constitutionally entrenched in order to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. Implicit in these values is
a truism that South Africans have the unconditional right to full citizenship,
accessed through possession of a valid identity document that does not only
guarantee participation in economic activities and related property ownership
rights, but also registration on the common voter’s roll. The Constitution further entrenches the right
to make political choices that include choice of a political home and/or
political persuasion.
In its preamble the constitution
declares that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united by our
diversity’. This declaration undergirds the 1955 vision by the Congress of the
People as encapsulated in the Freedom Charter, an ancestral policy document
instructing to the ideational basis of being South African post 1994. The 1955
generation, amongst whom South Africa’s great luminaries such as Nelson
Mandela, created a vision that would, and via a Constituent Assembly process which
was a sequel to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), be
bequeathed to South Africans of all political persuasions and ideological
shades. It is for the same reason that the constitution instructs all South
Africans, as they were acting through their representatives at the time of its
adoption, to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights. A foundation for
democracy was thus established.
In the South African scheme of
things it was very heartening to observe, during these elections, the inner
circle of the national official opposition party, the DA, which is still perceived
to be inherently a continuation of the erstwhile whites only United-Party-Progressive-Federal-Party-Democratic-Party
political complex, albeit on a definite change path embodied in the post 1994
relaunched DA, embracing in an annexing sub-context the monuments and icons of
the struggle against Apartheid colonialism as their own. The claim to the
Mandela legacy as a continuation of the 2011 launch of the DA’s manifesto at
Kliptown, the ANC’s ancestral policy mecca became yet another positive in this
maturity path. The embrace of Mandelaism, like the 2011 launch, represented a
tacit adoption of the Freedom Charter dictums as the context of all political
contexts in South Africa. This embrace makes The Freedom Charter a
representative embodiment of freedom demands to be inscribed as the template
upon which political parties may have to be judged in future. The extent to
which a party can convince South Africans on achieving the demands set at Kliptown
in 1955 will in the near future be its main appeal to the electorate.
Translation of the Freedom
Charter demands over time will nuance political formation’s election
manifestos. The opening demand ‘the people shall govern’ remains the most
contested as it guarantees the state means through which the attainment of
subsequent demands of the charter could be done. The pre-occupation with
political power and a slow movement in redefining the economic power landscape
created a lag in the realisation of economic dividends associated with
political mandates given to the ruling ANC. Unlike in other liberation movement
governed African states, the South African democratic experiment was preceded by
a Mandela-De Klerk led political accord that adopted constitutional principles
which an independent judiciary will use as a reference point to adjudicate the
constitutionality of policy trajectories as codified in legislation. The 2016
local elections seems to have sharpened the spirit and letter of the political
accord as well as the opening demand of the Freedom Charter; ‘the people shall
govern’.
Whilst some of those that voted
the DA celebrated the declaration of Robert McBride as ‘murderer’ by a ‘case
law’ dependent independent judiciary, it was consoling to see the DA celebrating
another ‘murderer’ in Mamelodi in the name of Solomon Mahlangu. The extent to
which the strategy was a collective emotion of the historical voting base of
the DA is what South Africa still needs to decode as we progress. The
in-country potential of the visit to these monuments as well as the salient
educative impact by the history of these heroes is what the tourism ministry should
exploit. In this reawakening, South Africa should be opportunistic in weaving
into this embrace of struggle heroes, a strategy to resuscitate the
anti-British imperialism heroics of the Afrikaner anti-colonial struggle that
incidentally created for South Africa a complete detachment of the colony from
the pre-1960 coloniser. It is our collective responsibility to recognise and
celebrate the fact that South Africa was ‘decolonised’ from imperialist and
extractive British colonialism by a narrowly defined nationalist movement that
ultimately realised the limitations of a race-based nationalist path.
The embrace of struggle icons still needs to
be followed-up by visible presence of the ‘new members’ of the anti-Apartheid or
‘pro-Mandela-type-freedom’ nation. The previous celebration of national
holidays has clearly divided South Africa in terms of those that see these
holidays representing their defeat and those that display triumph against
Apartheid and by default ‘whiteness’; and invariably creating an
never-will-embrace-Apartheid nation drawn mostly from Apartheid victims,
natural democrats and repenting neo-racists. The shepherding of the DA’s
historic constituency to recognise other non-Mandela heroes that are
McBride-like is one of the greatest dividends of our maturation process should
be yielding; a spirit that should find its path into the emotional fundamental
of ‘some’ in the country’s judiciary, given their serial liberation struggle
context denouncing judgements to date.
The importance of
decentralisation that is anchored by a capacity to generate own revenue is now
cast in stone as the best aspect of South African democratic life. The
competition for the 6 Metropolitan municipalities as key jurisdictions with
which political parties can demonstrate their ready to govern capability has
entrenched the multi-jurisdictional nature of political mandate sourcing. The
elevation of individuals, through the ‘involvement’ of the community, in
municipal ward contests may have reintroduced the need to have Parliament being
directly elected on the basis of constituencies; this seed has found resonance
within the ANC, this is despite the failed Tshwane last minute candidate
parachuting experiment. The integration of society into non-race based
communities seems to be the only obstacle for such a system to be embraced by
predominantly black political formations, if the voting demographics are used
as evidence.
The reality of the political
ignorant or naive ‘born frees’ becoming a new voting factor as a result of the
opportunity dividends of the 1994 democratic breakthrough is a positive that
will redefine the ‘broad church’ fallacy within a profoundly pro-left ruling
ANC. The shift from race-identity politics to ideological voting as well as
service delivery excellence voting will force the introduction of efficiencies
in the public service and public sector. The policy making machinery requisite
to stem the tide of voter takeover by a growing opposition within a shrinking
voter population creates a bonded investment to be cashed in at a historical
epoch by either of the emerging ideological poles. This presents new
theoretical insights on the political science domain for South Africa; a feast
for social and political scientists.
Given the above, it should
henceforth be unacceptable for South Africans to accept the narrative which
suggests that liberation struggle context is the context of all non-white
politics. Similarly it must be unacceptable to lump all-for-ANC supporters to
be pro-left thus discounting the preponderance of right-wing economic
lieutenants, neo-liberals, liberals and libertarians in the ANC. In fact, the
ANC’s formation in 1912 was a liberal construct with a profoundly American
Congress influence and a predominating Garveyist and Wilberforcean liberalism.
The founding constitution of the ANC drew an ideological fault line which
defines most in-ANC factional tensions, conflicts and splits to date. In fact
the simmering and somewhat in the open tensions between the left-in-the-ANC
supported by the left-organised-in-the-SACP and the right-in-the-ANC supported
by the right-within-the-opposition-center-right is a manifestation of some
ideological rapture occurring in the ANC.
The right to vote and make
political choices opened the historically non-voting black constituency as a
new ideational market for political formations. Parties that have a standing
ideology and a heritage of sustaining a discourse changing or dominating
machinery within the procedural dictates of a regularised electoral system. To
these parties, formal power contestation is a maintenance matter and the
potential of being ‘arrogant’ is progressively diminished by a concomitant rise
of arrogance by the ‘new-in-power’ entrants. The grammar of power is in these
conditions always in conflict with the new concepts introduced by the new-in-power
thus making procedural practice look like a capitulation to past power and
invariably lending post-liberation leadership in perpetual conflict with
institutions designed to protect democracy. The historical adversarial
relationship with political power in South Africa has mutated into a breed of
solidarity that defends corruption, state-capture and other ills often
associated with power aggrandizement.
The outcome of the 2016 Local
Government Elections which stripped the ANC of the ultimate prize of politics,
government, has in fact placed into the hands of parties opposed to continued
ANC rule resources in excess of R100bn in direct terms, and potentially far
much more in influence multiplier terms. These resources, represent to the
opposition a capacity to translate their political manifesto into tangible and
sub-national government endorsed delivery programmes that will demonstrate to
the electorate the state of readiness by the opposition to ascend to national
government management. The dictum emerging from within the stalwart cohort of
the ANC that ‘we fought against Apartheid to afford ourselves and future
generations a right to self-determine the socio-political and ‘somewhat’
economic future of South Africa has, and through the 2016 local government
elections outcome, brought the future forward at a speed commensurate to what
obtains in the technological advance environment. In respect of what the future
holds in electoral terms, the 2016 outcome can never be viewed as an absolute
indicator; it should rather be subjected to a Zulu proverb “never cast your
spear before making sure of your foothold”.
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