The African National Congress, arguably the nexus of all political life in South Africa, is under pressure from history to undergo one of its most consequential reviews since its formation. History has bestowed on it, throughout its existence, the obligation to be a leader of society amid a vortex of competing interests. What is becoming apparent is that the way the ANC structured itself to execute the anti-colonial struggle cannot be the same as the way it structures itself as a governing party. As the nexus of politics influencing public policy, the efficiency within the ANC will always determine the stability or otherwise of South Africa as a democracy.
Whilst the CODESA outcome was underpinned
by a liberal democratic construct, the post-liberation rhetoric within the ANC
has not matched the exigencies of the Constitution it has agreed to. The
normative guidelines imposed by the Constitution on the public administration
system are of a liberal democratic nature, and the ideological prerogatives of
the governing party are profoundly skewed towards a leftist paradigm, as
reflected in post-liberation transformation rhetoric. This makes the governing
party a substrate for all ideational risks, enabling it to build a strong and
stable state.
The success or otherwise of South Africa
as a State requires a recalibration of the ANC to establish a relationship that
is not antagonistic to the institutionalist character of the State, which
shapes its core agency, the government. It is in the systems that define
government that the dominant-in-the-GNU governing coalition status of the ANC
will find an opportunity to give expression to its policies as the ultimate
victor in the contest for government, the prize of politics. Because the ANC is
a dominant force in shaping how interests determine government as an industry,
it has become an institution that embodies primal public power in ideational
terms and should thus be of interest to how it is organised, even to those who
are not its members.
Our electoral system is structured to
declare political parties as institutions that ultimately establish government
in executive authority terms. It convenes Parliament, which has legislative
authority vested in it, and, through specific organs of state within the
matrices of power, establishes independent courts in which the judicial
authority is vested. This makes political parties the primary base of
unregulated public power; their internal workings can destroy a democracy. The
ANC, as a potential suitor to this, has, as a result, become a contested entity
due to the political capital it commands.
As an organisation, the ANC is structured
to allow the then-oppressed to raise diverse grievances. Addressing how it can evolve to better serve the nation can inspire the audience to believe in the potential for meaningful change.
Should ANC branches be as central to the determination of South African power architecture as they have been? Considering this can empower the audience to reflect on their role in shaping political influence.
This question is informed by the truism
that, as a democracy, South Africa may be procuring a system that can supply
people into its institutional makeup who can meet its competency demands. In
terms of attributes, the erstwhile 30-year governing party might have been a
good supplier of politicians; in terms of skills and knowledge, it seems to
have either dismally failed or been in perpetual experimentation.
The opportunity for mavericks to ascend the
ANC’s power ladders is as real as it is for quality leadership to ascend. The
reliance of its centre of performance indicators on the network or nodes of
influence in branches makes the capacity of its leadership to dispense
patronage anchored in those nodes a key driver of continued support; otherwise,
it is recalled on the horizon.
There are other reasons
necessitating a review of the extent to which the power of branches should be centralised. This
might include sub-questions like: do we think the tensions between those who
have demonstrated a capacity to "work" branches and those who make
branches "work-for-them" have not necessitated a complete overhaul of
how branches influence the direction of the ANC?
Does the time have or hasn't come to
revisit the structure of the ANC?
For instance, how about ensuring that each
of the 52 regions has mandatory representation in the NEC? All Zones in a
region are to have Mandatory representation in the REC. All areas must have mandatory representation on the PEC. Voting at Regional, Provincial, and
National Conferences should instead be about RWC, PWC and NWC. Other
configurations should include how decisions are carried through.
If leadership is anchored in its origins.
It will make ANC Conferences once again centres for discussing policy, as
leadership issues would have been resolved.
If the South-Africa-centric ANC really
needs to neutralise the leadership contestation circus that has robbed it of
the time to think about society beyond its membership, it should introduce a
Top Nine system to replace the Top Six. This might mean introducing two Deputy
Presidents, a Deputy Treasurer General, and a second Deputy Secretary. All Top
Nine positions should be institutionalised to be representative of all
Provinces in the Republic.
At Thinc, we are in the midst of a historic demand to initiate one of the most
consequential reviews of the ANC as an institution. Government reforms rest on
a substrate of political power, which is currently seen as an inherent risk. We
are a country with a federal geography, yet we want to force-fit a unitary
paradigm for managing political power. The social bases of our politics seem vulnerable
to ethnic mobilisation.
I am thinking aloud
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