This edited version of this article was published by the CITY PRESS: 10 May 2009
The 2009 national elections results have not only redefined the South African political landscape but also laid the basis for the fracturing of existing paradigms of intergovernmental relations. The intergovernmental relations honeymoon that was ‘oiled’ by an almost monolithic governance script determined through intra-party dealings appears to have waned with the queues that renewed current political mandates. The political arrangements yielded by the provincial ruling/opposition party dichotomy are now poised to create an intergovernmental relations excitement never seen and experienced in our shores.
The resuscitation of ‘fight back’, ‘rooi-gevaar’ and potentially ‘swaart gevaar’ through euphemisms like ‘stop Zuma’ and ‘the two thirds majority scare’ are now part of our 2009 elections sloganeering history. The degree to which these have defined the character of our opposition politics and by extension the co-operative government culture that was in the process of maturing, albeit within a one party dominated multi-party environment, is now an academic question. The gladiatorial approach of the DA election strategy that secured its Western Cape victory will, if unchecked by a triumphant DA, have an impact on intergovernmental relations.
The South African constitution defines the country as ‘one sovereign democratic state’ with government constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government that are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Whereas the constitution guarantees the indivisibility of the country as far as sovereignty is concerned, it remains vulnerable in terms of discouraging an ideological secessionist tendency reminiscent of federal democracies such as the United States of America. The emerging vector of provincial identity entrenched through the ballot process, distinct ethno-racial demography as well as the concretising provincialism amongst the South African populace has now found significance in the 2009 Western Cape election results.
If we accept Mangabeira Unger dictum that democracy ‘is a regime in which the basic arrangements of socio-political life are chosen by the wills of free and equal citizens’, we should equally expect of constituency loyal leaders to execute their mandate to the fullest. The ANC enters the realm of governance with a ‘working together we can do more’ mandate that is by its nature not adversarial. The DA enters the same realm with a ‘one nation one future’ mandate that was anchored by the ‘Stop Zuma’ and therefore ‘Stop ANC’ call. The execution of these mandates will dictate the spirit of co-operation going forward; that is if ever body stays loyal to what they represent in the eyes of the voter.
In an attempt to mitigate these inherent risks of regionalised government in multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-ethnic democracies like South Africa the constitution provides for a co-operative government approach. Loosely explained it is simply a governance philosophy based on a reciprocal obligation of spheres of government to trust, support and assist one another in co-coordinating service delivery to the community. It would include a legal, political and moral obligation to inform and consult one another as well as co-operating with and co-ordinating efforts on matters of common concern and joint projects, thus patterning intergovernmental collaboration and co-operation to ensure the success of national development projects.
Strictly speaking, the approach represents a compromise position on the unitary-federal scale of political management orientations dominant amongst current political coalitions of South Africa. Whilst it ambitiously procures for collaboratories, the approach is extremely dependent on the socio-political maturity level of political formations and coalitions. The electoral rancour that defined the mandate procurement process should however not be a reason for non-co-operation. The City of Cape Town experience, particularly the chemistry that developed between the Rasool /Zille administrations should provide a case study for the ensuing period. A back to basics attitude to cooperative government between national and provincial administrations should have as control standards the following.
Firstly; to what extent does national government respect the provincial mandate of provincial government in terms of service delivery/ In answering this question it should be borne in mind that outside the ‘stop Zuma’ atmosphere there were service delivery promises by the winning party.
Secondly; if we accept the Zille assertion that the bulk of the ANC vote was a so called ‘identity vote’, it follows therefore that the 23% vote the ANC achieved in the western Cape needs to be given an ‘identity treat’ by the ANC through nearest representation of government and in this case a DA led-government. The need therefore for the provincial government to be ‘part’ of a ANC led Cabinet Lekgotla planning process become a non-negotiable. Fortunately for the DA it will be joining a ‘together we can do more environment’ that is align-able to whatever ‘one nation one future’ means
Thirdly the emerging centres of political power should work within the prescripts of the constitution and supporting legislations to make intergovernmental relations work. Established interaction points and structures should be harnessed to boost service delivery; the importance of a South Africa first orientated bureaucracy should in this instance be emphasised.
For South Africa, the permutations of current political arrangements signal an end to the post liberation intergovernmental relations honeymoon. Reminiscent of other known relationships, new stakeholders to the dispensing of central political power have not only arrived in opposition political terms but some amongst them command electorally mandated political power. The only solace for society is that the South African intergovernmental relations approach is not only an effective method of governance but also an apprenticeship in negotiation, the art of conflict resolution, which is an inevitable dimension of political life in our society.
The 2009 national elections results have not only redefined the South African political landscape but also laid the basis for the fracturing of existing paradigms of intergovernmental relations. The intergovernmental relations honeymoon that was ‘oiled’ by an almost monolithic governance script determined through intra-party dealings appears to have waned with the queues that renewed current political mandates. The political arrangements yielded by the provincial ruling/opposition party dichotomy are now poised to create an intergovernmental relations excitement never seen and experienced in our shores.
The resuscitation of ‘fight back’, ‘rooi-gevaar’ and potentially ‘swaart gevaar’ through euphemisms like ‘stop Zuma’ and ‘the two thirds majority scare’ are now part of our 2009 elections sloganeering history. The degree to which these have defined the character of our opposition politics and by extension the co-operative government culture that was in the process of maturing, albeit within a one party dominated multi-party environment, is now an academic question. The gladiatorial approach of the DA election strategy that secured its Western Cape victory will, if unchecked by a triumphant DA, have an impact on intergovernmental relations.
The South African constitution defines the country as ‘one sovereign democratic state’ with government constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government that are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Whereas the constitution guarantees the indivisibility of the country as far as sovereignty is concerned, it remains vulnerable in terms of discouraging an ideological secessionist tendency reminiscent of federal democracies such as the United States of America. The emerging vector of provincial identity entrenched through the ballot process, distinct ethno-racial demography as well as the concretising provincialism amongst the South African populace has now found significance in the 2009 Western Cape election results.
If we accept Mangabeira Unger dictum that democracy ‘is a regime in which the basic arrangements of socio-political life are chosen by the wills of free and equal citizens’, we should equally expect of constituency loyal leaders to execute their mandate to the fullest. The ANC enters the realm of governance with a ‘working together we can do more’ mandate that is by its nature not adversarial. The DA enters the same realm with a ‘one nation one future’ mandate that was anchored by the ‘Stop Zuma’ and therefore ‘Stop ANC’ call. The execution of these mandates will dictate the spirit of co-operation going forward; that is if ever body stays loyal to what they represent in the eyes of the voter.
In an attempt to mitigate these inherent risks of regionalised government in multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-ethnic democracies like South Africa the constitution provides for a co-operative government approach. Loosely explained it is simply a governance philosophy based on a reciprocal obligation of spheres of government to trust, support and assist one another in co-coordinating service delivery to the community. It would include a legal, political and moral obligation to inform and consult one another as well as co-operating with and co-ordinating efforts on matters of common concern and joint projects, thus patterning intergovernmental collaboration and co-operation to ensure the success of national development projects.
Strictly speaking, the approach represents a compromise position on the unitary-federal scale of political management orientations dominant amongst current political coalitions of South Africa. Whilst it ambitiously procures for collaboratories, the approach is extremely dependent on the socio-political maturity level of political formations and coalitions. The electoral rancour that defined the mandate procurement process should however not be a reason for non-co-operation. The City of Cape Town experience, particularly the chemistry that developed between the Rasool /Zille administrations should provide a case study for the ensuing period. A back to basics attitude to cooperative government between national and provincial administrations should have as control standards the following.
Firstly; to what extent does national government respect the provincial mandate of provincial government in terms of service delivery/ In answering this question it should be borne in mind that outside the ‘stop Zuma’ atmosphere there were service delivery promises by the winning party.
Secondly; if we accept the Zille assertion that the bulk of the ANC vote was a so called ‘identity vote’, it follows therefore that the 23% vote the ANC achieved in the western Cape needs to be given an ‘identity treat’ by the ANC through nearest representation of government and in this case a DA led-government. The need therefore for the provincial government to be ‘part’ of a ANC led Cabinet Lekgotla planning process become a non-negotiable. Fortunately for the DA it will be joining a ‘together we can do more environment’ that is align-able to whatever ‘one nation one future’ means
Thirdly the emerging centres of political power should work within the prescripts of the constitution and supporting legislations to make intergovernmental relations work. Established interaction points and structures should be harnessed to boost service delivery; the importance of a South Africa first orientated bureaucracy should in this instance be emphasised.
For South Africa, the permutations of current political arrangements signal an end to the post liberation intergovernmental relations honeymoon. Reminiscent of other known relationships, new stakeholders to the dispensing of central political power have not only arrived in opposition political terms but some amongst them command electorally mandated political power. The only solace for society is that the South African intergovernmental relations approach is not only an effective method of governance but also an apprenticeship in negotiation, the art of conflict resolution, which is an inevitable dimension of political life in our society.
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