The 2011 Local government elections have come and gone. The political landscape and template has definitely changed. Voting patterns have been redefined with historical slogans been subjected to a new acid test. The Mandela and Mbeki era born generation is fast ascending the stage of political influence with ‘genetically modified seeds’ of what the struggle history means to them. The era of party branding that is linked to collective loyalty is fast been replaced by the rise of the sovereign individual demanding loyalty to individuality.
The South African democracy is maturing and responding to the dictates of present day demands of society. The salient elements of constitutional democracy as conceptualised by the CODESA consensus are now taking shape. The benefits of multijurisdictional election mandates found prominence in the 2011 elections. The idea of a national ruling party learning to become an opposition whilst in control of the majority of votes is a lesson of democracy for parties that subscribe to democratic centralism.
The often underestimated power of regionalism in multi-ethnic/racial communities like South Africa has at last found space in the secret discourse of major political formations. The plastered-on crack of racial disharmony has demonstrated capacity to reappear at the slightest threat of political power loss as well as confidence to dislodge the ANC powerbase. The class structure of South Africa has now been defined in terms of new euphemisms for race and class such as madam, stooges, darkie and so on. The importance of constituency representation has at last found space in the ascendance to power methods of the ruling ANC, albeit configured with a ‘democratic centralist’ context.
Notwithstanding the above dividends of our democratic constitution, the biggest beneficiary has been service delivery and the dignity of an African and his/her history. The toilet saga has squarely positioned in the agenda of all parties the importance of human dignity irrespective race, gender or creed. The DA’s court defence and the manner in which its spin doctors have dealt with the aftermath of the Makhaza toilet ruling has cornered the DA into becoming a party that respects the demography of South Africa’s constituency. The swift, although nation-building risky, decision of the DA to remember the owners of the Verwoerd statue is yet another example of its new found respect for black dignity; only history will tell on their new found path.
The service delivery narrative that was forced on the political manifestos of contesting parties has seen smaller parties being exposed in terms of their readiness to govern. Political rhetoric was pushed to the background not only by the pre-election ‘service delivery protests’ but also the ascendant pragmatism that is now finding its hold on the South African voting populace. Whilst struggle history will for a long time be an invaluable asset to the ruling ANC’s claim to be the legitimate party to govern South Africa, its appeal will depend on the resolve to craft a nation building message that defines the history as belonging to ‘all South Africans’.
The path towards 2014 has now been defined by the 2011 electorate. An analysis of the actual voting patterns in each voting station should be telling of the shifting ground and thus rewriting how the South African voter will in future be mobilised. The Malema generation with its kaleidoscopic character will be determinate in the definition of 2014 and its aftermath. The degree to which members of this generation across political parties will find consensus on fundamental issues such as land redistribution, management of the economy, generational mix of leadership and the importance of South Africa as a global player in the context of its AU and BRICS obligations; will be telling of a post 2014 South Africa.
Creating a political centre has always been strength of the ANC pre and post 1994. The regionally propelled disintegration of the centre as manifest in the ‘plot to oust Zuma’ discourse, runaway provincial voting patterns that have in some instances bordered on the repudiations of ‘centre intents’, outright disregard of centre decisions as seen in the reaction of branches to the local government list process, and the increase in number of independents by ‘party die hards’; does not bode well for continued centralisation in its current form. The case for party modernisation has never been as clear. The 2011 elections post-mortem NEC discussions will be incomplete if party modernisation is not part of the agenda.
The growth in confidence of alliance partners, at least at leadership level, to question the centre represents a dimension of the democracy dividends. This dimension corresponds with the growth in civil society activism and a resuscitated claim by the South African intelligentsia for its space as catalysts of social discourse. The flood of strategic think tanks into the national intellectual space has now become a new movement whose disjointed agenda lacks a South Africaness glue reminiscent of pre-1994 times. The loyalty of think tanks to their ideas and those of funders creates a political destabilisation platform with consequences similar to what the ‘Kenyan’ democracy is experiencing from its ‘vibrant’ civil society.
The strategic importance of local government in service delivery can no longer be undermined in any discourse about governance in South Africa. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude that has seen superordinate spheres of government adopting a master knows all attitude has been repudiated by pockets of DA rule in municipalities that demonstrated the power of localised discretion. The political capital that has been accumulated to propel South Africa’s democratic enterprise is a case study for anyone aspiring to redefine history. In short the political template has shifted; it is ‘business unusual. The road to Mangaung is now littered, only a well-considered waste management strategy can reconfigure the future.
The South African democracy is maturing and responding to the dictates of present day demands of society. The salient elements of constitutional democracy as conceptualised by the CODESA consensus are now taking shape. The benefits of multijurisdictional election mandates found prominence in the 2011 elections. The idea of a national ruling party learning to become an opposition whilst in control of the majority of votes is a lesson of democracy for parties that subscribe to democratic centralism.
The often underestimated power of regionalism in multi-ethnic/racial communities like South Africa has at last found space in the secret discourse of major political formations. The plastered-on crack of racial disharmony has demonstrated capacity to reappear at the slightest threat of political power loss as well as confidence to dislodge the ANC powerbase. The class structure of South Africa has now been defined in terms of new euphemisms for race and class such as madam, stooges, darkie and so on. The importance of constituency representation has at last found space in the ascendance to power methods of the ruling ANC, albeit configured with a ‘democratic centralist’ context.
Notwithstanding the above dividends of our democratic constitution, the biggest beneficiary has been service delivery and the dignity of an African and his/her history. The toilet saga has squarely positioned in the agenda of all parties the importance of human dignity irrespective race, gender or creed. The DA’s court defence and the manner in which its spin doctors have dealt with the aftermath of the Makhaza toilet ruling has cornered the DA into becoming a party that respects the demography of South Africa’s constituency. The swift, although nation-building risky, decision of the DA to remember the owners of the Verwoerd statue is yet another example of its new found respect for black dignity; only history will tell on their new found path.
The service delivery narrative that was forced on the political manifestos of contesting parties has seen smaller parties being exposed in terms of their readiness to govern. Political rhetoric was pushed to the background not only by the pre-election ‘service delivery protests’ but also the ascendant pragmatism that is now finding its hold on the South African voting populace. Whilst struggle history will for a long time be an invaluable asset to the ruling ANC’s claim to be the legitimate party to govern South Africa, its appeal will depend on the resolve to craft a nation building message that defines the history as belonging to ‘all South Africans’.
The path towards 2014 has now been defined by the 2011 electorate. An analysis of the actual voting patterns in each voting station should be telling of the shifting ground and thus rewriting how the South African voter will in future be mobilised. The Malema generation with its kaleidoscopic character will be determinate in the definition of 2014 and its aftermath. The degree to which members of this generation across political parties will find consensus on fundamental issues such as land redistribution, management of the economy, generational mix of leadership and the importance of South Africa as a global player in the context of its AU and BRICS obligations; will be telling of a post 2014 South Africa.
Creating a political centre has always been strength of the ANC pre and post 1994. The regionally propelled disintegration of the centre as manifest in the ‘plot to oust Zuma’ discourse, runaway provincial voting patterns that have in some instances bordered on the repudiations of ‘centre intents’, outright disregard of centre decisions as seen in the reaction of branches to the local government list process, and the increase in number of independents by ‘party die hards’; does not bode well for continued centralisation in its current form. The case for party modernisation has never been as clear. The 2011 elections post-mortem NEC discussions will be incomplete if party modernisation is not part of the agenda.
The growth in confidence of alliance partners, at least at leadership level, to question the centre represents a dimension of the democracy dividends. This dimension corresponds with the growth in civil society activism and a resuscitated claim by the South African intelligentsia for its space as catalysts of social discourse. The flood of strategic think tanks into the national intellectual space has now become a new movement whose disjointed agenda lacks a South Africaness glue reminiscent of pre-1994 times. The loyalty of think tanks to their ideas and those of funders creates a political destabilisation platform with consequences similar to what the ‘Kenyan’ democracy is experiencing from its ‘vibrant’ civil society.
The strategic importance of local government in service delivery can no longer be undermined in any discourse about governance in South Africa. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude that has seen superordinate spheres of government adopting a master knows all attitude has been repudiated by pockets of DA rule in municipalities that demonstrated the power of localised discretion. The political capital that has been accumulated to propel South Africa’s democratic enterprise is a case study for anyone aspiring to redefine history. In short the political template has shifted; it is ‘business unusual. The road to Mangaung is now littered, only a well-considered waste management strategy can reconfigure the future.
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