The ANC is once again getting into a succession discourse. The contest for political power within the ANC, if you like, its unofficial ‘primaries’ before the 2019 national elections, is in full swing. The contest will continue the despoliation of the ANC’s liberation movement character without introducing in its stead a party political alternative. In its conduct of the succession discourse the ANC has, and since its unbanning in 1990, been perfecting its new tradition of referencing its past without a commitment to break it asunder and bringing forth a newness that re-creates it as a ‘new liberation’, liberation movement.
The ‘new liberation’ is more than just removing the shackles of colonialism and apartheid, but introducing in that whirlpool a trajectory that redefines South Africa as a player in the economic liberation struggle characterised by competition for ‘investor’ legitimation and acceptance. Whilst this competition has become some form of economic spirituality that perpetually reveals a ‘post political liberation’ fear that can only be assuaged by the meticulous preservation of neo-liberal economic policies, sustenance of inherited inequalities, a non-black global economic governance system and a passionate adherence to values of established and dominant ‘economic traditions’ in the mould of Fukuyama’s declaration that we have reached the end of history; this competition still procures from the ANC a new ideological posture divorced from its pre-ruling party status.
The ‘new ideological posture’ would have to reshape the myths ,symbols and rituals of past traditions, and thus ANCness, in such a way that they become a persuasive blueprint for action that would propel South Africans to rise up and save their country from sliding off the liberation euphoria precipice characteristic of post-liberation democracies. The posture should assist the ‘new liberation’ seeking South Africa to negate the closed system character of ideology which often refuse to afford itself an opportunity to take alternative views seriously. In the global ocean of economic orthodoxy as marshalled by neo-liberal economic thought, which in itself is not necessarily abhorrent to growth led development and/or development led growth, the ‘erstwhile cold war’ inspired pro-east and anti-west ideological posture of the liberation movement require a recalibration in order to let it focus on what the ‘new post liberation polity’ requires as opposed to what (our) ‘position’ dictates.
The need to reflect on leadership of and in the ANC is greater than what its normal internal processes dictate or would provide. Leadership in the ANC needs to be retooled into an institution that drives organisational politics as opposed to politics being a tool that drives leadership politics. The prevalence of interest as the context of all contexts within the ANC should be neutralised in favour of creating new and overarching interests requisite for the current political period. Notions of marginalising the apolitical and yet enfranchised in society should be discarded when leadership choices for the ANC are made. It is in the ANC’s understanding that governing South Africa is not about or on behalf of ANC members where the ANC will find its sense on how to choose leaders for society.
The redefinition of the new South African polities as a result of post-liberation exigencies such as managing the state and running government, call for a deliberate focus on ANC leadership choices. Given that institutions, especially because of their importance to politics, embody power than opinion, the time for the ANC to create institutions of leadership that will regulate those elected therein has arrived; this urgency is necessitated by the fact that politics in South Africa is a career and no longer a conscientious endeavour dependent on situation created leadership; those that want to lead must be allowed to say so, without fear of the 'unwritten rules' that worked in the 'underground'. The new career character of politics dictate a need for some selection criteria for a person to be considered as a deployee into positions of responsibility. The voluminous nature of information, data and knowledge require of politicians mental faculties that have been disciplined by post school leaning equivalent to a university degree and/or diploma.
The durability of government, the entity in law character of the state as well as the never neutral form of interests in a political system, creates for the ANC an additional pressure to engage with succession matters concomitant with demands of the current period. Succession is in politics a function of continuity preservation, and never orthodoxy preservation. Overt and covert principles instruct what needs to be continued, if a successor is to be anointed or elected. In the absence of an ideological path and framework, as it seems is the case with the current period ANC, convention and tradition will often be relied upon when succession debates start. Leadership become, in these circumstances, vulnerable to the highest bidder in respect of resources required to capture the state and/or the ANC as a sure conduit, assuming the electorate is a constant, to state power. If continuity were to be a criteria in the ensuing succession discourse in the ANC, the question is what should be continued from what the incumbent has started?
Given that Jacob Zuma is the subject to be succeeded and, arguably, an inconvenient point of departure to many, ‘what is to be followed’ will have to be construed from a prism that has his legacy as a dominant feature. His person will thus be the foreground of his term of office. If the ANC’s party policy position is bracketed to discern what Jacob Zuma stands for, the only recorded pronouncement by him when assuming office will in this instance serve as a point of reasonable departure to determine what should be continued for continuity’s sake. The Zuma administration set for itself a ‘term’ obligation from which continuity can be derived. In his inaugural speech in May 2009, President Zuma declared that;
We make a commitment here and now, before the eyes of the world, that:
For as long as there are South Africans who die from preventable disease;
For as long as there are workers who struggle to feed their families;
For as long as there are communities without clean water, decent shelter or proper sanitation;
For as long as there are rural dwellers unable to make a decent living from the land on which they live;
For as long as there are women who are subjected to discrimination, exploitation or abuse;
For as long as there are children who do not have the means nor the opportunity to receive a decent education;
For as long as there are people who are unable to find work,
we shall not rest, and we dare not falter.
In this declaration President Zuma defined his political term’s mission and path within the broader ‘liberation’ of South Africans and at the same time positioning the country for the ‘new liberation’ liberation struggle.
The ANC has, in the past seven years of the Zuma Presidency, been able to direct state resources towards the attainment of the above declarations. There is in fact evidence that the Zuma administration has been able to migrate state resources towards what he declared at inauguration. In fact it can be argued that he has succeeded in focussing his government on the term mission he set for himself. It is in the delivering subsystem where continuity is questioned to a level where delivery itself becomes ignorable, at least in the eyes of 'discourse shapers', because the jury is out in so far as beneficiaries are concerned or allowed to show concern. The simplicity of the declared intents for the Zuma term created sieves of in-delivery digressions noticeable when ultimate cost of delivery accounting are computed. It is in this forest of contestation wherein continuity of the Zuma legacy is in question.
Whilst history might have a favourable slot for a Zuma presidency in terms of advancing the substantive demands of his constituency and his term’s mission, the procedural aspects related to that delivery may discount a substantial portion of that ‘success’. Without justifying and/or patronizing the land restitution program in Zimbabwe, the muted tones on the return of the land to ‘white farmers’ in the ‘struggle’ that sought to dislodge Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe remain indicative to how the opposition in Zimbabwe views his method of land redistribution. Similarly, the inability of some in in-ANC constituencies to out rightly call for a process change in how the service delivery supply chain subsystem is controlled, might be indicative of its preference, and probably in less pornographic terms as successive public protector reports have painted them to be.
The succession debate is thus wrought with systemic inconsistencies that put a post Zuma South Africa at the risk of institutionalizing factions on the basis of who eats less, without criminalizing eating itself. The science of politics attest to a truism that the price of politics is government. Perfect politics have for a long time been about the subordination of the governed to the will of those in power; such is the inverse of the Lincolnian adage on democracy being a government of the people by the people for the people. In this context, the definition of who ‘the people’ are, spawn an equally explosive discourse. In contrast and yet conforming, a Mangaberian alternative provides some solace in declaring that democracy is the arrangements by which society agrees to govern itself. The Mangaberain approach is profoundly civil society driven thus allowing both aspects of succession to be interrogated; in as much as delivery is critical, the ‘process capture and control’ issues are equally important.
The emergence of in-ANC coalitions around one issue or another, the succession sub-text predominates all manner of discourse. The various constitutional and ‘reaction driven’ coalitions are developing into compartments of persuasions reflective of suppressed orientations characterising the post 1994 ANC. The cosmopolitan character of South Africa’s ideational posture, which is defining to what is or should be national interest is playing itself in the public space on the basis of what is allowed to be the main discourse. Political discourse from policy think tanks is now leading political parties with potentially catastrophic implications for leadership succession in government. This growth of think tanks creates sieves of capture through the framing of what is or should politics be about as opposed to what the voting polity is expecting and experiencing of government.
In its analysis of scenarios obtaining in the oncoming succession contestation between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Rand Merchant Bank produced a probability matrix based on the views of five analysts who are variously known for the ideational agreement on one faction in the ANC. Whilst the methodological potency of the analysis is within what is generally accepted when such analyses is made, it would have been ideationally prudent for the analysis space to be opened to other orientations on the same subject. The analysis, notwithstanding its timeousness, continues on the concretizing media driven trajectory that 'if we don't like what you say you will not be allowed to be heard beyond us'. A conditions that creates a singular voice as the only target not to be listened to in constituencies that determine who ascends the 'liberator' branded ANC Presidency.
JUST THINKING ALOUD
FM Lucky Mathebula
th!nc Foundation
www.justthinc.co.za
The ‘new liberation’ is more than just removing the shackles of colonialism and apartheid, but introducing in that whirlpool a trajectory that redefines South Africa as a player in the economic liberation struggle characterised by competition for ‘investor’ legitimation and acceptance. Whilst this competition has become some form of economic spirituality that perpetually reveals a ‘post political liberation’ fear that can only be assuaged by the meticulous preservation of neo-liberal economic policies, sustenance of inherited inequalities, a non-black global economic governance system and a passionate adherence to values of established and dominant ‘economic traditions’ in the mould of Fukuyama’s declaration that we have reached the end of history; this competition still procures from the ANC a new ideological posture divorced from its pre-ruling party status.
The ‘new ideological posture’ would have to reshape the myths ,symbols and rituals of past traditions, and thus ANCness, in such a way that they become a persuasive blueprint for action that would propel South Africans to rise up and save their country from sliding off the liberation euphoria precipice characteristic of post-liberation democracies. The posture should assist the ‘new liberation’ seeking South Africa to negate the closed system character of ideology which often refuse to afford itself an opportunity to take alternative views seriously. In the global ocean of economic orthodoxy as marshalled by neo-liberal economic thought, which in itself is not necessarily abhorrent to growth led development and/or development led growth, the ‘erstwhile cold war’ inspired pro-east and anti-west ideological posture of the liberation movement require a recalibration in order to let it focus on what the ‘new post liberation polity’ requires as opposed to what (our) ‘position’ dictates.
The need to reflect on leadership of and in the ANC is greater than what its normal internal processes dictate or would provide. Leadership in the ANC needs to be retooled into an institution that drives organisational politics as opposed to politics being a tool that drives leadership politics. The prevalence of interest as the context of all contexts within the ANC should be neutralised in favour of creating new and overarching interests requisite for the current political period. Notions of marginalising the apolitical and yet enfranchised in society should be discarded when leadership choices for the ANC are made. It is in the ANC’s understanding that governing South Africa is not about or on behalf of ANC members where the ANC will find its sense on how to choose leaders for society.
The redefinition of the new South African polities as a result of post-liberation exigencies such as managing the state and running government, call for a deliberate focus on ANC leadership choices. Given that institutions, especially because of their importance to politics, embody power than opinion, the time for the ANC to create institutions of leadership that will regulate those elected therein has arrived; this urgency is necessitated by the fact that politics in South Africa is a career and no longer a conscientious endeavour dependent on situation created leadership; those that want to lead must be allowed to say so, without fear of the 'unwritten rules' that worked in the 'underground'. The new career character of politics dictate a need for some selection criteria for a person to be considered as a deployee into positions of responsibility. The voluminous nature of information, data and knowledge require of politicians mental faculties that have been disciplined by post school leaning equivalent to a university degree and/or diploma.
The durability of government, the entity in law character of the state as well as the never neutral form of interests in a political system, creates for the ANC an additional pressure to engage with succession matters concomitant with demands of the current period. Succession is in politics a function of continuity preservation, and never orthodoxy preservation. Overt and covert principles instruct what needs to be continued, if a successor is to be anointed or elected. In the absence of an ideological path and framework, as it seems is the case with the current period ANC, convention and tradition will often be relied upon when succession debates start. Leadership become, in these circumstances, vulnerable to the highest bidder in respect of resources required to capture the state and/or the ANC as a sure conduit, assuming the electorate is a constant, to state power. If continuity were to be a criteria in the ensuing succession discourse in the ANC, the question is what should be continued from what the incumbent has started?
Given that Jacob Zuma is the subject to be succeeded and, arguably, an inconvenient point of departure to many, ‘what is to be followed’ will have to be construed from a prism that has his legacy as a dominant feature. His person will thus be the foreground of his term of office. If the ANC’s party policy position is bracketed to discern what Jacob Zuma stands for, the only recorded pronouncement by him when assuming office will in this instance serve as a point of reasonable departure to determine what should be continued for continuity’s sake. The Zuma administration set for itself a ‘term’ obligation from which continuity can be derived. In his inaugural speech in May 2009, President Zuma declared that;
We make a commitment here and now, before the eyes of the world, that:
For as long as there are South Africans who die from preventable disease;
For as long as there are workers who struggle to feed their families;
For as long as there are communities without clean water, decent shelter or proper sanitation;
For as long as there are rural dwellers unable to make a decent living from the land on which they live;
For as long as there are women who are subjected to discrimination, exploitation or abuse;
For as long as there are children who do not have the means nor the opportunity to receive a decent education;
For as long as there are people who are unable to find work,
we shall not rest, and we dare not falter.
In this declaration President Zuma defined his political term’s mission and path within the broader ‘liberation’ of South Africans and at the same time positioning the country for the ‘new liberation’ liberation struggle.
The ANC has, in the past seven years of the Zuma Presidency, been able to direct state resources towards the attainment of the above declarations. There is in fact evidence that the Zuma administration has been able to migrate state resources towards what he declared at inauguration. In fact it can be argued that he has succeeded in focussing his government on the term mission he set for himself. It is in the delivering subsystem where continuity is questioned to a level where delivery itself becomes ignorable, at least in the eyes of 'discourse shapers', because the jury is out in so far as beneficiaries are concerned or allowed to show concern. The simplicity of the declared intents for the Zuma term created sieves of in-delivery digressions noticeable when ultimate cost of delivery accounting are computed. It is in this forest of contestation wherein continuity of the Zuma legacy is in question.
Whilst history might have a favourable slot for a Zuma presidency in terms of advancing the substantive demands of his constituency and his term’s mission, the procedural aspects related to that delivery may discount a substantial portion of that ‘success’. Without justifying and/or patronizing the land restitution program in Zimbabwe, the muted tones on the return of the land to ‘white farmers’ in the ‘struggle’ that sought to dislodge Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe remain indicative to how the opposition in Zimbabwe views his method of land redistribution. Similarly, the inability of some in in-ANC constituencies to out rightly call for a process change in how the service delivery supply chain subsystem is controlled, might be indicative of its preference, and probably in less pornographic terms as successive public protector reports have painted them to be.
The succession debate is thus wrought with systemic inconsistencies that put a post Zuma South Africa at the risk of institutionalizing factions on the basis of who eats less, without criminalizing eating itself. The science of politics attest to a truism that the price of politics is government. Perfect politics have for a long time been about the subordination of the governed to the will of those in power; such is the inverse of the Lincolnian adage on democracy being a government of the people by the people for the people. In this context, the definition of who ‘the people’ are, spawn an equally explosive discourse. In contrast and yet conforming, a Mangaberian alternative provides some solace in declaring that democracy is the arrangements by which society agrees to govern itself. The Mangaberain approach is profoundly civil society driven thus allowing both aspects of succession to be interrogated; in as much as delivery is critical, the ‘process capture and control’ issues are equally important.
The emergence of in-ANC coalitions around one issue or another, the succession sub-text predominates all manner of discourse. The various constitutional and ‘reaction driven’ coalitions are developing into compartments of persuasions reflective of suppressed orientations characterising the post 1994 ANC. The cosmopolitan character of South Africa’s ideational posture, which is defining to what is or should be national interest is playing itself in the public space on the basis of what is allowed to be the main discourse. Political discourse from policy think tanks is now leading political parties with potentially catastrophic implications for leadership succession in government. This growth of think tanks creates sieves of capture through the framing of what is or should politics be about as opposed to what the voting polity is expecting and experiencing of government.
In its analysis of scenarios obtaining in the oncoming succession contestation between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Rand Merchant Bank produced a probability matrix based on the views of five analysts who are variously known for the ideational agreement on one faction in the ANC. Whilst the methodological potency of the analysis is within what is generally accepted when such analyses is made, it would have been ideationally prudent for the analysis space to be opened to other orientations on the same subject. The analysis, notwithstanding its timeousness, continues on the concretizing media driven trajectory that 'if we don't like what you say you will not be allowed to be heard beyond us'. A conditions that creates a singular voice as the only target not to be listened to in constituencies that determine who ascends the 'liberator' branded ANC Presidency.
JUST THINKING ALOUD
FM Lucky Mathebula
th!nc Foundation
www.justthinc.co.za
Powerful Prof.
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