The African National Congress, arguably the nexus of all political life in South Africa, is in the midst of a demand by history for one of its most consequential review since its formation. History has bestowed on its entire existence the obligation to be a leader of society in a vortex of competing interests. How the ANC structured itself to execute the anti-colonial cannot be the same as how it structures itself to be a governing party. As the nexus of politics instructing to public policy, the efficiencies within the ANC will always be determining on the stability or otherwise of South Africa as a democracy.
Whilst the CODESA outcome came with a Liberal Democratic Construct undergirded by the Rule of Law, the post-liberation rhetoric within the ANC has not matched the exigencies of a Constitutional Democracy. The normative guidelines imposed by the Constitution on the public administration system are of a liberal democratic nature, and the ideological prerogatives of the governing party are profoundly skewed towards a leftist paradigm etched on post-liberation transformation rhetoric. This makes the governing party a substrate of all ideational risks to build a strong and stable state.
The success or otherwise of South Africa as a State requires a recalibration of the ANC to have a relationship that is not antagonistic to the institutionalist character of the State it is at the centre of its core agency, government. It is in the systems that define government wherein the governing party status of the ANC will find and opportunity to give expression to its policies as the ultimate victor in the contest for government as the prize of politics. Because the ANC is a dominant force in how currencies determining government as an industry, it has become an institution that embody primal public power in ideational terms, and should thus be of interest in how it is organised, even by those who are not its members.
Our electoral system is structured to declare political parties as institutions that ultimately establish government in executive authority terms. It convenes Parliament with legislative authority vested in it, and through certain of organs of state within the matrices of power establish into independence courts in whom the judicial authority vests. This makes political parties the primal base of unregulated public power, their internal workings can destroy a democracy. The ANC as a potential suitor to this has as a result become a contested entity due to the political capital returns it commands influence over..
As an organisation, the ANC is structured to allow the then oppressed to have an opportunity to raise a diverse set of grievances. The extent to which it is structured to treat the then oppressed as the new political elite and establishment is what this discourse cannot unravel. To this effect there are questions that would now require answers. These questions can assist in the review process;
1. Do we think ANC branches should be as central as they have been in the determination of South African power architecture?
This question is informed by the truism that South Africa as a democracy may be procuring for a system that can supply into its institutional make up humans that should be able to meet its competency demands. It attribute terms, the governing party might have been a good supplier of politicians, in skills and knowledge terms the governing party seems to have either dismally failed or in perpetual experimentation.
The opportunity for mavericks to ascend it power ladders is as real as it is for quality leadership to ascend. The reliance of its centre of performance indicators determined by the network or nodes of influence in branches makes the capacity of its leadership to dispense patronage anchored on those nodes a key driver of continued support, otherwise recall it on the horizon.
There might of course be other reasons necessitating a review of how central should the power of branches be. This might including sub-questions like, do we think the tensions between those that have demonstrated a capacity to "work" branches and those that make branches "work-for-them" have not necessitated a need for a complete overhaul of how branches influence the direction of the ANC.
2. Do we think the time has or hasn't come to revisit the structure of the ANC.
For instance, how about ensuring that each of the 52 regions have mandatory representation in the NEC. All Zones in a Region to have Mandatory representation in the REC. All regions to have mandatory representation in the PEC. Voting at Regional, Provincial, and National Conferences should instead be about RWC, PWC and NWC. Other configurations should include how decisions are carried through.
If leadership is anchored whence it comes from. It will make ANC Conferences to once again be centres at which policy is discussed as leadership issues would have been resolved.
If the a South-Africa-centric ANC really needs to neutralise the leadership contestation circus that has robbed it of the time to think about society beyond its membership, it should introduce a Top Nine system to replace the Top Six. This might mean introducing Two Deputy Presidents, a Deputy Treasurer General, and a second Deputy Secretary. All Top Nine positions should be institutionalised to be representative of all Provinces in the Republic.
In Thinc we think as a country we are in the midst of a demand by history to initiate one of the most consequential review of the ANC as an institution. Government reforms have this substrate of political power as it is currently made up as an inherent risk. We are a country that has a federal geography and yet we want to force-fit a unitarist paradigm of political power management. Social bases instructing to our politics seem to be vulnerable to ethnicity as a vector.
I am thinking aloud
🤷🏽♂️ A ndzo ti vulavulela
🤷🏽♂️ Be ngisho nje
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