Civil society is amending the constitution outside Parliament, the courts are unconsciously colluding.

 The influence of civil society bodies and movements committed to truncating the post-1994 political economy gains in South Africa is inexorably rising and on the verge of defining the 'liberation movement' complex out of relevance. These bodies have become the largest magnets of non-political party funding that has political economy recalibration intents. Created as constitution defending bodies, social capital accumulation entities, and political capital risk mitigation movements, they have craftily succeeded in undermining the power of traditional democratic power often associated with quantitative voting, otherwise also referred to as majority rule.

The thrust of their strategy has been to crumble all efforts aimed at levelling the economic playing field. The freedoms that the constitution protects have been gradually redefined to include the freedom to defend the economic status quo. Case law, most of which has its origins in jurisprudence whose intents were at some point in our history about entrenching hegemonies which necessitated the anti colonial struggle, is the core substrate of defining new economic freedoms with little to no challenge by the historically marginalised, or 'leader of society'.

These civil society bodies have locked major socio-economic gains, and used the power of civil litigation, the largest cost prohibitive terrain of a new struggle, to win greater influence on any transformation and change aspect of South Africanness. They have defended language-based exclusions as a proxy for race-based minority rights; peeled off the edifice of 'black economic empowerment' within a 'state capture' manufactured consent firmament; reduced the reach and influence of 'public' policy through establishment of 'no-government' zones within which class based own affairs could be exercised; and, establishing virtual 'federal states' whose government is propelled by a outside the one trillion rand in the 'proven doubtful' hands of government as an agency of the state.

The economic might of core funders of the civil society movement, most of whom their loyalty to a variously defined South African 'social justice' is suspect, has been progressively weaponised to undergird the bullying of government not to aggressively pursue a 'radical socio-economic transformation' (in all its contested variants) program. 

The hegemonic purveyors of the new civil society driven 'minority rights protection' narrative has been the 'old establishment owned media outlets' and 'the economic establishment controlled advertising spend decision power'. These have for a while projected state dysfunction as a manifestation of the incorrectness of 'socio-economic transformation' as a strategy to reconfigure templates of economic domination. The human error induced catastrophe of 'state capture' has been contrasted with a 'no media freedom' pre-1994 less reported 'state capture' era of the erstwhile apartheid political economy hegemonic complex. The gladiatorial projecting of 'spoils of crime against humanity gains' by 'from-beneficiary-societies' captains of industry are presented as 'morally defensible' feats of humane triumph.

The images of government dysfunction, political party factionalism, infrastructure decay, and sheer mismanagement of the South African democracy by a time or phase bound leadership 'cohort' are paraded as a reason to truncate the reach of 'state intervention' in the marshalling of its economic commanding heights to 'benefit all'. The celebration of a manufactured 'saviour role' of private sector investment into an otherwise 'dually' developing economy is presented as an alternative to a 'regering gevaar' narrative.

The appetite for authoritarianist government policies as long as they do not interfere with the bottom line by 'old establishment capital' has been on the rise as impatience about government dysfunction grows. In their authoritarian enclaves, as manifest by the gross income and salary gaps, the South African private sector, and through funded civil society proxies, including the fourth estate, has been successful in showcasing only its strengths and concealing its weaknesses. Whilst the South African private sector commands the largest single consumer of public goods and services, and manages the 'other trillions' in the economy, influences social condition and opinion, and thus a potential adversary to state power, the state remains the single most custodian of the republic's executive authority. The context of being private as a sector will always be public, which the state is. 

The growing influence and successes of the civil society movement in the policy industry of South Africa is fast becoming an opiate to policymakers when matters of national interest are at stake. Their 'manufactured' or otherwise prowess as towering institutions of immense strength and overwhelming intellect has bred insecurity within those whose responsibility is to reconcile the conflicting interests of society through public policy; government. The anxiety which these civil society victories on constitutional matters, most of which are in fact, and strictly speaking, CODESA dividends, should not only send shivers of despair and insecurity into the 'socio-economic transformation' context of South Africa, but be the reason to ignite a constitution and litigation driven new struggle for social justice. 

In the recent past we have observed the transformation revisionist ambitions of 'certain of the civil society bodies' ,and by collusion of funding those of the private sector. They seek to impose a gradualist and trickle down socio-economic transformation pathway, which by the way might still be an option given the mishaps associated with 'radical transformation'. Their pursuit of a private sector led transformation agenda, whose model is anchored on the reduction of state involvement in the economy, and creation of a linear path within which profits are protected, is not only suspect for its reliance on a demographics challenged private sector but also the underlying capital structure assumptions it is making. 

What should be done

South Africa needs to continue encouraging the growth and influence of its civil society movement. Save for its leadership of the anti-apartheid struggle, the actual struggle was a civil society endeavour. It was only when agreement on the criminal nature, form and content was reached by civil society that its date with being removed on the statutes was set. 

It is the agenda of these bodies that should be the subject of social cohesion. It is natural that the gains of apartheid will be defended by beneficiaries for as long as any change to them threatens their livelihoods as they know them. The ideological power of the 'own affairs' posture most apartheid beneficiaries have created as a 'laager' within which the defence of gains is argued needs to be understood within the exigencies of building a non-racial if not a multi-racial future. 

South African leaders of 'certain' civil society bodies that have abrogated to themselves the responsibility to defend the apartheid gains, have 'grown more impatiently aggressive in the pursuit of their objectives and leaning on narrow nationalist tendencies, particularly 'own affairs ideology' and 'economic survival' as non-negotiable departure points for any social cohesion project. What we need to do as a response to this reality, is to commission a process that seeks to non-racialise these insecurities within a context of growth to and for all. The somewhat sense of 'political panic' about the projected strength of these bodies should be managed away from developing into an insecurity by those that must act. 

There is always a risk to use these isolated, albeit impactful, litigation victories, which are in themselves 'constitutional amendments of a special type' outside of Parliament, to spur divisions in society. Inflating the threat of the victories outside the rights content that goes with it can, if not properly analysed, be weaponised to project the governing elite as being weak against the unleashed litigation onslaught. 

There is therefore a need to establish a policy outcome focussed commission of inquiry to collect views on what needs to change in our democracy so that social cohesion is driven by a properly defined national interests. The capacity of civil society movements to pursue 'funder briefs' can derail social cohesion.

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