One
of the most preventable decisions that have plunged the country into a disaster
is the introduction of independent power producers and how the country
transitions to that future. While in climate change standards, the decision
might have been one of the best, in how it impacts the livelihoods of South
Africans, it comes out as the worst decision ever to be made by a country’s
National Executive. The rigid organisational structure the governing complex
has grown into, the muted fear to challenge the centre by voices of reason
within the governing complex, has put a country in a condition where perishing
at the hands of benevolent dictatorship contexts is a reasoned option.
Decisions on electricity were thus taken within the prism of economic interests
of imposing the creation of a new establishment by hook or crook.
Thus
far, we have seen a growing imbalance between thinking and doing. With the
dearth of innovation and long-term political economy thinking in the governing
complex, achieving the variability of thinking and dealing with the realities
of doing has been one of the hardest things to do if the outcomes of thinking
challenge what is desired. What has happened is that almost all decisions on
electricity have increased uncertainty. The absence of network thinking as a
process of allowing for a spectrum of options on how to transition society has
been one of South Africa's new, rigorous, and systematic approaches to
demonstrate how incumbents in the governing complex have succeeded in refusing
the national brain trust to reduce uncertainty on electricity supply. The
nearest memory of how to govern and the institutional design of the government
seems to be amenable to a govern or rule by decree to levels where the greatest
comfort space to think is contexts where no one questions, whence the
declaration of a state of national disaster.
The
National Executive has been obeying the clock set by its international
commitments to the exclusion of asking the proverbial strategic question, is
what we are doing so right the right thing to do? It would seem the decision to
rush the alternative energy policy decisions, including all other instruments
like environmental levies, carbon taxes, and funding models for new
infrastructure did not go through the basic processes of comprehensive
leadership quality analyses. Because there needed to be better pausing,
reflecting, and solicitation of inputs on how just transition can happen
without disrupting what we have, the already brittle electricity supply system
could not be ready to adapt when anything goes wrong during the transition.
With commitments to the carbon credits and new money systems, the higher
interests, most of which are in the global financialisation of public policy
decisions, pausing to review the just transition process might foreground
problems the new order does not have an appetite to deal with. The sense of
perspective required to deal with actual societal issues during the transition
would foreground matrices which include minimum base load and energy
availability factor, all of which the financialisation has no appetite to
include in their modelling.
Dissent as a native in any development-driven policy environment like South Africa was exiled and othered to represent anti-establishment thinking. Instead of being curious about the implications of the new policy direction, there has been a drive to compel the energy complex to mix only one dimension of what is acceptable as the true energy mix. The promotion of self-affirming questions to confirm the established answers to why questions should have been subjected to the how questions to test the validity of answers to why.
Understanding
how we got to have Andre de Ruyter as part of the solutions complex would lead
to questions about how we ended up with the governing complex we have.
Arguably, South Africa might be a public policy diabetic. We have the required
public policy, which as a society cannot convert into implementable because we
either overthink without doing or do a lot without thinking. Almost akin to
being (policy) obese, with no (insulin) to help convert to what society
needs. We must accept that Andre (and all those that appointed him) and all that he represents, are a solution that has failed, and should be removed. CUT!!
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