The context of Putin and attendance of the BRICS summit in South Africa?

As South Africa is undergoing one of the external to its context pressures to its otherwise volatile currency, the rand, pundits and thinkers alike are pondering on how it extricates itself from its legal obligations in terms of its statutes. The influence of the rand on the economy runs deep. Its position in the global forex environment and its price determination prowess on the local economy make it the apex indicator of global markets’ perception of South Africa and its overall policy choices. The upcoming BRICS summit, and the attendance of President Putin, who has a warrant of arrest on his name by the International Criminal Court, has foregrounded itself as yet another test of South Africa's loyalty to its declared commitment to the rule of law. 

Hypotheses are proffered on the various options available to policy and decision-makers. The impact of events on South Africa's economy features more prominently than the underlying causes of the crises pressuring monetary policy variables, particularly the rand. Subtle and deep truths about South Africa's contribution to the decline of the value of the rand as its anchor variable to inflation, such as its non-alignment policy on the Russia-Ukraine 'war-tension-conflict-operation' whilst in a formal BRICS alliance with Russia as a member, are yet to be unravelled. 

 

The inconvenient truth is that the rand woes are rooted in South Africa's diplomatic stance on Russia-Ukraine. The enthusiastic non-alignment policy position of South Africa, whilst its economy has British economy proxy characteristics, and dependence on the US and European markets for its primary industry goods, compromises its wishful economic sovereignty in real terms. The idea of wanting to be economically independent of Europe has been the dominant driver of South Africa's economic systems design from as early as Paul Kruger's Zuid Afrikaansche Republic. 

 

South Africa's alliances since the 1800s, including the First and Second World Wars, were all based on the political emotions obtained then. However, it has always been the country's economic interests that triumphed as to who South Africa ultimately supported, and then the support was material. Notwithstanding the desirability of fighting on the side of Germany in both wars, the complexities of untangling the local economy from its British networks and financial services reliance dictated a logic of fighting on the side of the allies in both wars. 

 

Whilst BRICS is theoretically the strongest economic power bloc in potential GDP per capita if its resources are prudently marshalled, the cumulative power of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency as well as the total of G7 currencies, makes the BRICS countries a tough option for weaker economies to genuinely intercourse with.

 

Beyond the geopolitical and global political economy sensitivities of dislodging from the non-BRICS economic community of nations, South Africa, arguably most BRICS member countries and aspirants, would not want to be obscurant to the smooth functioning of their otherwise functional financial services sector. As a member of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system, which powers most international money and security transfers, South Africa appreciates the SWIFT numbers its financial services and the trading sector is bound by for its success. SWIFT, a vast messaging network financial institutions use to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive information, such as money transfer instructions, is currently the backbone of South Africa's economy, transaction speaking.

 

In decoloniality terms, and maybe completing the anti-colonial struggles of the nineteenth century, the rhetoric of imagining an alternative to SWIFT, and creating new world currency reserves, is ideationally palatable. In so far as the dictates of trade partner relations care and harnessing, South Africa's statistics will be choking to euphoric decisions that are not evidence-based. If there is a lesson for South Africa not to flirt with peer pressure at multilateral interactions and take nonsensical policy decisions, how it emotionally entered the just transition policy space and obliterated its base load must guide it on the "BRICS is the alternative" discourse. There needs to be more evidence that China, the 'global power' firmament most BRICS aspirant countries are clamouring to be under, is not ready to take leadership of the new global order economically. India is reluctant, and Russia still has to be convinced if it will ditch the hold of its oligarchs on the economy. Brazil might be a commanding influence in Latin America, but its strength as a state is still suspect.

 

In any case, in terms of wealth and military capabilities, the pillars of global power, the entire BRICS complex comes second to the US alone. The hypothesis, which seems to this rendition the most fertile, is that rhetoric and truth are not the same thing and should thus, at all times, be clearly distinguished. In global realpolitik, no state acts on the theory that it can have a perpetually neutral or non-aligned opinion on every diplomatic question. The invitation of Putin to the BRICS summit by South Africa, notwithstanding the ICC complexities that accompany it, will be a statement on where South Africa stands in the deeper issues instructing to the Russia-Ukraine situation. 

 

As a putting shot on Putin, this rendition submits that South Africa should expect that President Putin might not attend the summit for reasons far removed from the arrest warrant. It is inconceivable that the war will be over in August 2023. There is a military argument that it might intensify, given the additional material support Zelensky was guaranteed in Tokyo. There is no precedence for a Russian leader to leave the seat of government to an acting President when there is an active war. The risks of Putin travelling amid a war close to his end-of-year term are too big to warrant him putting strain on South Africa. 

 

It would therefore require South Africa to juggle its diplomatic options to pacify a progressively hostile Western complex. The prospect of ignoring international law, worse in which it is a signatory, South Africa might raise the stakes above what any country of its economic size can afford. However, engaging Russia within the context of Russia's objective realities might throw the perceived quagmire into the ring of major power diplomacy. Nostalgic arrogance and potential hubris might be at play and catching out the current generation of political leaders to levels where they have pushed too hard and too fast for an otherwise self-solvable matter. 

If indeed South Africa wants to reclaim its high moral ground in diplomatic circles, the idea of non-alignment instead of neutrality must be revisited. South Africa must instead prepare for a long campaign for influence that will test its ability for strategic diplomatic leadership and legitimacy without being a global power. CUT