While
the problem of leadership has always been the liberation movement's growing
problem from a necessity point of view, it has now taken on the character of an
inescapable concern. Through leadership quality, society can have a dialogue
with itself about the future. Given that leaders are, and in a materialist
doctrine sense, 'products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore,
changed leaders are products of other circumstances and upbringing, we tend to
forget that leaders of organisations change circumstances and the leadership
environment'. The African National Congress has, in the last three decades,
been in a complex dialogue with itself about what value system it wants to
project itself as representing now that it commands the state power.
In the vortex of policy pronouncements and
preoccupation with the deconstruction of the apartheid system, the liberation
movement believed in the persuasive potency of its documents, notably the eye
of the needle, more than the prowess of the role models it allowed, through
deployment, to determine the cadence of its leadership responsibility towards
society. Given that those in leadership will be brought closer to each other
because of their mutual respect, which flows from sharing in the confraternity
of power, it has not been easy to thread a philosophy of leadership outside the
paradigm of problematising authority as a necessary structure to ensure
stability and succession. There are leaders that end up in front of others, a context often
mistaken to mean that those behind them are following when being in front is
what most are clamouring for.
The resignation of Mavuso Msimanga, and
potentially others that did not go public, given the warning of the ANC SG to
stalwarts, carries with it the reputational value that has been manufactured
and curated around him. He resigns from the positional advantages of Deputy
Chairperson of the MKVA and an influential member of the 101 Veterans of the
ANC. These organisations possess the largest concentration of in-ANC
person-days experience, which creates a critical bridge of in-ANC generations
that only written accounts can attempt to complete. While his resignation will
uproot him from the institutional edifice the ANC afforded him with power to
influence, the societal positions he occupies in the memory of society will
determine the new reach of his value to South Africa.
Basic political theory teaches that
individuals are components of interests. They are embodiments of the
diversities in society upon which politics are generally based. Their sovereign
character as individuals makes them not simply puppets of interests but can
operate as nodes of sponsored blocks of interests. With accumulated social,
political, and economic capital, they can quickly become the substrates of
interests and thus affect the course of politics by their opinions or
coalitions.
Individuals often favoured by history will
define, structure, or construct a political order with which they will answer
the questions 'who rules', 'who should rule', and 'how to be ruled'. Over time,
the political elites presiding over the political order, and based on the power
and resources they command, have been able to create arrangements with which
they would govern society, including themselves. This, they agreed, will be
called the government of, by, and for the people; otherwise, it will also be
called a democratic order. The political order establishes hierarchies inside a
class that rules and a democratic order establishes hierarchies inside a class
that governs in terms of defined mandates, also called the Constitution.
These arrangements of hierarchies in
society establish axioms of power very few revolutions, if any, have been
able to deconstruct as templates of political elite building. Despite the
grandiose political rhetoric during revolutions or struggles, the unequal
distribution of political power stays constant; the resultant elites are
internally homogeneous after a revolution, if not unified and homogeneous. The
striking feature of post-liberation elites is their ability to be
self-perpetuating and exclusive, albeit essentially autonomous. This explains
why almost all political questions are settled according to the interests of
the political elite. Mavuso Msimanga was a component of such elites in South Africa.
It is only when there is a miscarriage in
the construct of a beneficiary political or otherwise elite that the ruling
establishment will fund a new revolution to restore the pecking order in
society. The pursuit of a position where the probability of influencing the
policies and activities of the state or the authoritative allocation of values
remains the single potent glue with which political elites are built. This
constitutes the main currency of higher-order politics or interests.
However, no interest is safe because
interests, if unmatched or unmanaged in a political order, are free to rise and
fall. This explains the maxim 'there are no permanent interests in a society
with diffused hierarchies'. If individuals become institutions and accumulate
capital beyond institutions that house them, they assume importance to politics
commensurate to the (perceived) power they embody.
In this context, the political or
otherwise capital of individuals like Mavuso in a society should be taken seriously. In
politics, it should be axiomatic that some people will have power more than
others, and often more than those who sit in positions which look like they
have the power. The South African Constitution vests authorities in the
legislature, the President, and the courts. It then diffuses the power to the
people as individuals or coalitions they are organised within. This creates
micro-coalitions with which the exercise of the various authorities can be
managed, controlled, and directed. At best, society can estimate the contours
of power distribution (political and economic) by relying on indirect evidence
from the depth of public participation.
In the parlance of Hlengani Mathebula, 'the resignation is a painful moment for the movement requiring honest reflection. He submits that Mavuso Msimanga is not a "Johnny come late into the movement but a highly decorated leader...entrusted with serious responsibilities."In Mathebula's comment, we read a call for the movement to understand the costs of losing cadres that are capsules required to cure the ongoing leadership degradation. In a period where the possibility of losing political power torments leaders more than focusing on the exigencies of providing leadership, the greatest barrier to sobriety of leadership is often not from outside but those that lead, and Mavuso might be pushed by 'breeds of methane' which smoke out the proverbial rats, even within the movement.
WA TWA!!
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