The appointment of Job Mokgoro as Premier of the North West was argued by a Ramaphosa Cabinet to be as a result of a need ‘to restore trust and confidence between labour and government’; ‘assist the province to upgrade its systems and capabilities to a normality’; ‘ensure compliance with the legislative and regulatory framework of government’; ‘stabilise the labour environment’; ‘restore sustainable service delivery’; ‘ensure security of staff’ and ‘improve financial management’.
Mokgoro was 'installed' as Premier in terms of section 100 of the Constitution. Section 100 is one of the instruments to facilitate ‘national supervision of intervention in provincial administration’ in the circumstance ‘a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation’. Such intervention is thus premised on the performance of the provincial administration and not the ‘politics’ instructing to the system.
The invoking of section 100 is in fact an intergovernmental relations intervention mechanism provided for in the Constitution. It flows from co-operative governance principles which are the basis of South Africa’s intergovernmental relations philosophy and government, which is based on a reciprocal obligation of spheres of government to trust, support and assist one another in co-coordinating service delivery. This includes a legal, political and moral obligation to inform and consult one another as well as co-operating with and co-ordinating efforts on matters of common concern and joint projects, thus patterning intergovernmental collaboration and co-operation to ensure the success of the national development project.
What these provisions are also by implication saying is that 'organs of state', elected or appointed, and acting through or with 'public power' bestowed upon them, are assumed to be acting in the interest of making 'government' as an agency of the State to work. ‘Executive obligations’ mentioned in the constitution, unless otherwise explained in another legislation, are understood to be specified in section 125 of the constitution dealing with the Executive Authority of provinces. Pyramiding this authority is it being vested in the Premier, and exercising it together with members of the Executive Council, and subject to provisions of section 100. The discretion of section 100 implementation looms therefore large in the absence of further circumscription by section 100 (3) of the constitution. It can thus be concluded that executive obligations are those in legislations promulgated in terms of the constitution, and anything outside that is either exogenous to them or discretionary to the extent the nature of politics dictate or allow.
However, the ability of an individual to have access to 'executive authority' is the function of politics obtaining in the process of appointing, 'installing', or otherwise by a political coalition commanding an electoral mandate to do so. In South Africa, a society reluctant to accept that it is a federal democracy with concretising regional rigidities, the political influence of provincial leaders of the governing African National Conference has been growing commensurate with the maturity of understanding the political economy undergirding our profoundly federalised political system. Provincial Chairpersons of the ANC have for some time been building into the system a condition of political original mandates, as the constitution of the country was hard at work to ensure they are mere conduits of administrative version mandate of the 'actual section 85 executive authority mandate' vested in the President, acting in concert with Cabinet.
The political power of Provincial Chairpersons of the ANC has also been shifting from it being a internal to the party matter, and becoming a nodal point of provincial political economy management and regional 'patronage' dispensing. The heritage of foregrounding branches of the ANC as basic units of political power has diffused the influence of politics into more than four thousand branches, fifty two regions, and nine provinces. These hierarchical units are supposed to be politically managed by a 80 member national executive committee, directed by a 6 member 'top six'. The potential for either neglecting the politics undergirding the system, or neglecting the politics demands of running a state looms large. This state of affairs have made the numbers game to progressively prevail at the expense of traditional in-ANC political ideation, when it comes to the procurement of the political mandate to lead the ANC, and by extension South Africa.
In the case of 'installing' Mokgoro, this was done as a mechanical process, and the politics that should have informed such a decision were grossly ignored. The 'installation' of Mokgoro was followed through with a mechanical 'uninstallation' of a in-ANC politically elected Provincial Executive Committee and 'installation' of an 'Interim Provincial Committee'. The 'uninstalled' Provincial Executive Committee successfully challenged its 'uninstallation' and a court order to 'reinstall' them is still active, given that no other legitimate process of reconfiguring through a in-ANC constitutional process was followed. This has created a political as well as a legal lacuna whose exploitation only a administration sophisticated person such as Job Mokgoro would have known how to exploit, especially in a sea of either ignorance or deliberate neglect of process by a still triumphant post NASREC cohort of dominant in-ANC leadership. A triumphalism that has thus far muddied a potentially illustrious political term of Ramaphosa, given the decisiveness he has displayed in dealing with COVID19 and some of the economic decisions, notwithstanding observable flaws in some.
A practical scenario now exists where the Job Mokgoro, who was 'installed' through a legitimately obtained 'political mandate' to occupy the 'apex' provincial executive authority, is faced with in a context where a recommendation to remove him is made by a 'court order' delegitimised 'Interim Provincial Committee', that might be acting with the concurrence of a 'potentially illegitimate' top six minus one of the ANC. What worsens this situation might be the reality of members of the Northwest Provincial Legislature who might not be in variance with the decision to remove the Premier, and might want to have a conscience vote when called to vote for a new Premier. The decision to appoint the new Premier, Bushy Maape, a capable individual in his own right, and plausible as it is, might be caught up in the quicksand of a ill considered process management, as the refusal to resign by Mokgoro is displaying.
Although treated as peripheral, the resignation of Mmoloki Cwaile, who masterminded the chaos creation process leading up to the uninstallation of Supra Mahumapelo and installation of Mokgoro, as MEC and staying on as MPL is a factor of political significance in the unfolding impasse. Cwaile is known to be a 'second' to Mahumapelo in 'working' the 'branches' towards outcomes they want in the Northwest. The combination of the two, and somewhat branch mobilisation savvy yet politically wounded, might be an epicentre for a political tremor whose reach might be felt beyond Mafikeng. As a political flu, it might find a highly compromised in-ANC immune system surviving only because there is not strong 'maverick' to challenge the new hegomon directly.
The political egg dancing skills of a Ramaphosa in-ANC Presidency will again be put to test. The local government list process, which is seemingly tilting in favour of the cohort of leadership that was 'uninstalled' when Mokgoro was 'installed' might be indicative to a changing political landscape in the province. The need to read, and correctly read, the political mood within the 'basic units' of the governing party, as well as in the broader society might have arrived sooner that expected. The catalyst role the refusal to resign by Mokgoro might be a domino of interesting political ramifications for our democracy in general.
The challenge can also mean that a recall of a Premier and President of the country might henceforth be dependent on the in-legislature dynamics, if conscience voting was allowed to prevail. The era of the individual becoming a provincial or national asset immediately after being sworn in as Premier might be birthed by the Mokgoro case study. Whilst the Mokgoro apparent intransigence to yield to conventional ANC democratic centralist approach to decision making, notwithstanding the politico-legal lacuna, might look destabilising, it might be opening a new vista for our democracy to explore how his actions might be insulating us from the growing prerogative might of in-ANC cliques, however benevolent. In-ANC thinker should not let this Mokgoro crisis to go to waste, it must be analysed for what it is, given the reality of coalition government landing on our political shores earlier than we procured.
As an organisation the ANC should accept that it no longer has absolute control of what its periphery dictates, and as a result of regionalised rigidities and exigencies, but it can now start learning how to control what is happening inside it as a substrate to be diluted through to the very periphery. As one of Africa's centre of political influence, it capability to navigate complexities characterising our democracy, which if federal, will provide leadership to a regional rigidities defined African political landscape.
🤷🏽♂️A ndzo ti vulavulela
🤷🏽♂️Be ngisho nje
🤷🏽♂️Ek praat maar net
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