The African National Congress is an organisation divided against itself. Since it has become a governing party in 1994, it has been defined by ideological differences on how to deal with economic transformation, tensions of leadership succession after Mandela and beyond, and generally acute contestations on policy direction the ANC should take on many an issue. The exodus of its leadership into public service positions in organs of state created an abnormal state-party dichotomy which sharpened the questions of who governs the state; the party or elected representatives.
The current President Ramaphosa is no stranger to in-ANC succession contestations for one position or another. The first senior position he held in the ANC, as Secretary-General, was wrought all sorts of contestations and conspiracies, most of whom confirmed him having been an inconvenient inclusion into the leadership establishment sooner than some would have anticipated. He would later be 'deployed' into the private sector, and yet remained an NEC member. As leadership contests unfolded, especially the historic Polokwane episode, he was asked to contest and is on record as having let that pass. In Mangaung, he was invited to stand as Deputy President, and he later ascended to the President position. In all his stints as a top-six official, he led strategic projects, notably the Constitution drafting process and chairing the influential deployment committee.
Post-1994 South African Presidents have all not been 'dogmatic' about ANC resolutions and policy positions. The expectations that members of the governing party had of its Presidents as State Presidents have been disappointing. As persons-in-front of the nation, they became part of the non-partisan political establishment whose standards went beyond the exigencies of just being ANC. As their worldview got recalibrated by obligations to the oath of office they took, and their social base changed as they got assimilated into sophisticated global power networks, what they pursued as policy positions started to appear subversive to many a conference resolution the ANC took.
The tension between the office of the Secretary-General, whose role is the custodian of ANC policies and resolutions, and that of the President of the country, whose role is defined in the Constitution and regulated by his oath of office, would thus be unavoidable. We noticed a context where the office of the Secretary-General start moving aggressively in wanting to establish Luthuli house as a political accountability centre for ANC deployees, similarly, the institution that the state is had also been wrestling to be the ultimate constitutional accountability centre. This has created a contest between the normative obligations imposed by the Constitution on state management affairs, and prerogative obligations imposed by party political palace expectations of how the state is managed. These contests have 'left the government, its bureaucracy and organs of state depleted of decision capability and thus paralyzed.
With the election of Ramaphosa as president, there was a general expectation that this struggle may have finally been decided in favour of a capable state. Entering this presidency through a meticulously engineered mandate of anti-corruption and anti-state capture, including a profoundly pro-market liberalisation social capital, as well as support by a clamouring for relevance and authority criminal justice system, the judiciary, in particular, Ramaphosa had the task of uniting his party through a service-oriented approach that would repurpose its politics. Having cut his political training in an industry of contrasting interests, him representing the most diverse of members organised under one union, including creating consensus where it was least expected during constitutional negotiations, Ramaphosa carried an expectation and reputation of 'Mr fix it' , in contexts where divisions abound.
Ramaphosa's fight against 'mentioned' corruption and his eagerness to stamp out its consequence of state capture has clearly endeared him to constituencies that are traditionally known to be hostile to the ANC. His break from tradition contest for ANC Presidency made him one of the most encumbered ANC Presidents, he brought into his accountability space new nodes. Impoverished by the global economic meltdown that started in 2008 already, and later COVID19 economic shutdowns, South Africa became a fertile space for any maverick or benevolent leaders to emerge above its party political discipline, and thus divisions. Worse, the democratic aspirations of an increasingly being devastated (black) middle class, his core support base, are waning, and a collective sense of isolation and victimhood is rising in their place. The surrounding context of youth unemployment and unemployability remains threatening to social stability and to strengthen those who pose as guardians of the radicalisation of transformation. In this turmoil, the ANC will soon need new leadership a transition in which Ramaphosa is set to play a critical role, and which could potentially result in him rising again as President of the ANC.
Contrary to the growing consensus of an irreversible decline of the ANC, these challenges it is facing promise to usher in a new era in the post-liberation ANCs history. The turmoil created by the current divide could give way to an ANC that is more cohesive and more assertive in trying to shape South Africa in its own image. As many of the individuals and past leaders, including those in the alliance structures, who defined in-ANC politics for the past three decades fade away, a cohort of new and South Africa first believing leaders will have the opportunity to reshape ANC politics and society. This might expand the ANC's hegemonic hold over the country’s economic growth trajectory.
In-ANC changes could also reshape its relationship with capital and its global investor network, particularly mega manufacturing factories creating ones. With the backing of a self-assured leadership and no fear of domestic instability, a new ANC will not shy away from confronting perceived existential threats from those that oppose its transformation intents. Even if it may compromise on fundamental policy issues such as land restitution to mitigate mounting economic crises at home, the new ANC might pursue strategic alliances with capital for growth's sake. The emergent ANCs primary focus will be the reduction of poverty, creating employment, and reducing the inequality gap. For this, it will seek social compacts with business and labour as antagonists. In this way, the new ANC will emerge as a trusted axis of reform and transformation. State and Capital (domestic or otherwise) relations will have to be transactional and revolve around what is in the national interest. 'The alluring promise of a broader rapprochement will no longer find fertile ground'. CUT!!!
🤷🏿♂️A ndzo ti vulavulela
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