South Africa has experienced unprecedented electricity load shedding since 2018 and has yet to show any hope of a quicker recovery, given its commitments to 'alternative energy sources'. This might go in history as the most energy-vulnerable era of South African life since the dawn of democracy. The reasons for the current situation have been ventilated enough; any repeat of why we are here is now an excuse for failing to do something about it.
President Ramaphosa's response to the energy crisis, since he entered the National Executive of South Africa as Deputy President, was meant to be his crowning achievement. It would have demonstrated the correctness of deploying to the National Executive leaders with a private sector ethic since the dawn of democracy in 1994. Coordinating the 'war room' on the energy crisis, and pointedly ESKOM was supposed to be the first pilot site to demonstrate the execution prowess of private sector leadership even in contexts that are public sector in character. Ramaphosa would have demonstrated that the private sector-reared government and business leaders were destined for leadership in the emerging political order.
To date, it has turned out differently. Incompetence, poor leadership, perennial corruption, grand and establishment state capture, and (claims of) sabotage held stronger than the political will to decisively deal with it. Stakeholders and Stakeowners in the consequential political economy have transformed themselves into juggernaut, complements of the efficiently inefficient crime-busting agencies in the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, the inside-the-state energy complex needs to demonstrate better strategic thinking and sheer capacity to respond.
In this whirlpool of indecisiveness, the instructing political system was battling structural factionalism internal to the ANC, compounding crises on another, never seen before in the life of the ANC. With shrinking prospects of revisiting South Africa's commitments to COP agreements on climate change, ESKOM, and the energy crises, might well be the political game changer with the most consequential review of the fledging political order. Energy crises in an economy and socio-political space spoilt by a consistently higher energy availability factor, energy supply disruptions, and insecurity can only optimise the unpredictability of the economic system. The course the energy crisis, notably load-shedding, is taking has invalidated the narrative of just transition at the altar of compromising base load. In fact, the noble intents of climate change South Africa have committed to and profoundly foregrounded by the gladiatorial alternative energy posture Ramaphosa has taken is headed for its most consequential review within the ANC and the country's establishment.
Less specific is what would such a review entail. Some scenarios are emerging out of the raging energy discourse and clamour to impose one hegemon or the other on policymakers.
The first and most likely scenario is that coal-powered energy generation will return to anchor the base load requirement to cushion the minimum required energy availability factor for the economy to go through the just transition commitments. This action will also demonstrate the extent to which South Africa's energy policy is sovereign. Given the commitments about coal, a great deal of change and work in the diplomatic space will have to be unleashed.
That said, the need to find areas of support with what is now called the coal mafia is unavoidable, given how they have been allowed to be a law unto themselves. To save face, the government might have to declare coal a strategic national asset whose export would have to be regulated as it manages the security of supply to opened and recommissioned power stations. For this approach to work, there might be a need to marginalise from the recommissioning space the need to involve the Financial Services sector and manage this as a pure state revenue-funded endeavour. What we need to craftily manage is the maximalist Ramaphosa approach to alternative energy supply as a solution; the independent power producers lobby seems to be the strongest ever in the energy policy complex of South Africa.
The second, least likely scenario is the outright privatisation of electricity generation with demands of the latest carbon filtering technologies if coal power station recommissioning is considered. The contracting for such a privatisation drive should obligate new private sector entrants to commit to supplying procured energy into the base load as they commission alternatives to gas or otherwise turbines to migrate from coal. Crossing the black economic empowerment and South African ownership requirement thresholds as a bulwark against compromising energy sovereignty could lead to a global investor backlash unless strictly BRICS-originated financing is going to undergird the privatisation process.
Privatisation also takes the form of Public-Private Partnerships, and the public may have to include municipalities entering the electricity generation space. Climate change obligations of the country might have to be managed through intergovernmental relations grants and penalties to ensure that household base load requirements are met at the point of need. An asymmetrical devolution of power generation and grid connections might have to be considered as the PPPs are considered. Better still, there might also be considerations of Community Public Partnerships where smaller towns can collaborate with boutique small independent power producers to generate need-defined energy and load surplus onto the grid. This might be decentralisation through opening up the generator space to non-state actors to enter as outright suppliers or partners to the state.
The third scenario is to continue with the status quo. Controlled load shedding until the IPP promise kicks in. Continue with the commitment to stop coal-powered electricity generation and mechanically wipe out the coal mining value chain and industry. The policy obstinacy in the midst of an energy-induced wrecking of economic activity will, in the meanwhile, continue unabated.
Notwithstanding the symbolism Ramaphosa carries against graft, corruption, and state capture, the energy-induced economic blood is busy making Marikana look like a picnic, if not a circus. Citizen response will come not because of the politics of energy but because of mundane livelihood frustrations as minor as having to throw away 'dipotsa' because they were load shed as you had just started cooking pap. The third scenario has regime change potential, even before an election.
What has to date kept the ANC as a governing party in power is that the public has not risen to oppose the just transition process the way it is configured. The majority of South Africans, given how the demographics of poverty, unemployment, and inequality continue to keep the apartheid era memory alive, are sceptical to vote for an alternative party to the now inconvenient 'liberator'. Similarly, the 'we told you brigade', who are still part of the dominating establishment and very much inside the templates of dominance, are sceptical to make the ANC succeed or get out of the quagmire without them getting concessions on participation in a majoritarian democracy. CUT!!!
🤷🏿♂️We need a dialogue as a people
🤷🏿♂️ku twa unga yingiseli e ku penga
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