It is rare to find a society, political parties, and civil society movements discussing the future of their country's leadership with the incumbent still in charge and pursuing a legally acceptable second term. This rarity is what a society like South Africa needs to project into the future whilst in the bunker of decisive leadership on many fronts. The crisis of government, which is arguably a crisis of leadership, as well as that of a society in search of a national identity through a maze of institutionalised diversities and divisions of class and race, might necessitate a crystal balling moment with the incumbents joining in to say without us what might be best. This rendition travels into that space.
(It would be prudent to posit what post-Ramaphosa means for this
rendition. It includes a context where the person of Ramaphosa is no longer the
President of South Africa under the conditions that he is at the writing of
this piece. This might mean one or either of the following condition; (a) his party has not returned him as its presidential
candidate when nominations are called in the first sitting of the 7th
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, in which case it might have another
person as a candidate; (b) his party has not met the threshold to be returned
as the majority party with the power to constitute the 7th
administration, and another person ascends as President; and (c) he returns as
President of the country on the mandate of a coalition majority in Parliament,
and thus his primary accountability shifts from party position to representative
voter positions.)
South Africa is undergoing a process of politically finding itself as a nation-state after thirty years. The democratic order is entering its consequential review phase. Elections are starting to be about service delivery and less about historical issues. The governing African National Congress has also announced its consequential renewal process. There is no known thesis of what the renewal end state is. There are questions about its liberation movement character versus its formal political party contesting for state power. There are questions of reconfiguring or reconsidering what or who are the motive forces of the National Democratic Revolution.
Arguably, the renewal
process underway can be described as ecdysis due to its glaring focus on the movement’s
outer cuticles, if not on the reputational optics it needs to survive the oncoming
review by society, the 2024 national elections. Pundits have already written
about the possible demise of the ANC’s historical electoral fortunes.
Internal to the ANC,
conspiracies about a Ramaphosa-the-person succession discourse are gaining
momentum. In-ANC-conspiracy theorists are hard at work manufacturing stories
with which new factions could be established to undergird one faction or the
other. The almost interrupted succession
path the ANC has set for leadership is again put under strain around
personalities rather than what a post-Ramaphosa presidency should look like.
This manifests through the
battle to dislodge Paul Mashatile as ‘heir’ apparent. Few, if any, analyses
have delved into what a post-Ramaphosa context should look like, irrespective
of who leads it. The preoccupation has again weighed on the person of Paul
Mashatile and not the presidency society desires beyond Ramaphosa, as defined above.
With the prospect of a potential coalition government after the 2024 national
elections, the discourse of a post-Ramaphosa presidency should be entertained
as a national interest issue than a party-political interest matter. If the
discourse is pitched at the appropriate or right level, political parties
should cease to be the context of all political contexts. Instead, the
liberation promises the Constitution guarantees society should be the guide on
how South Africa’s national interests could be advanced through the
accountability ecosystem of Parliament, the rule of law, and the supreme law as
its apex.
On the other hand, and potentially disappointing, a new and disintegrated opposition complex is under construction. Opposition to the ANC governing is the new ideology. Pity that what should be, to some, a transformation enabler and, to others, a conservative constraint to the abuse of power, the Constitution has not yet featured as the currency with which political power contests are traded. As a result, the person who might ultimately lead South Africa is becoming more important than the party.
As the rhetoric of economic transformation retreats at the advance of tangible programs for building the economy, the competence of who should lead society becomes important. The ascendance to power of South Africa's current president was on the back of the threat of corruption as a catalyst of a failed state. Using the state’s institutional power, calibrating in-governing power institutional mechanisms, and creating an anti-corruption firmament, Ramaphosa has arguably made corruption an election issue. As Julius Malema argues, corruption has put the transformation mandate that the Constitution imposes on the South African state on the back burner. It made post-apartheid South Africa a drama arena by personalities contesting for political power devoid of its public power obligations.
The
narrative linking corruption with ANC leaders has elevated the importance of
who leads South Africa beyond which party provides such a leader. The platinum
question becomes, therefore, what should a post-Ramaphosa presidency look like?
Firstly,
it should be about the fortification of the constitutional order. What the
Constitution guarantees its citizens should be the preoccupation of any future
president.
Secondly,
it should end the country’s tendency to shape government around personal
patronage networks, which are bedrocks to corruption, and craft an inclusive
conception of patriotism.
Thirdly, it should create an investor-friendly environment led by state-driven infrastructure development. State revenue chasing infrastructure investment should precede the dominant social welfarist spending. The new presidency must prioritise data access, energy, water, inland logistics infrastructure, and local mineral beneficiation as the backbone of the new development trajectory.
Building South Africa into Africa's economic behemoth should rally its vibrant, inclusive civic nation. The core strength of this endeavour should be an associated sense of duty and commitment to political and economic democracy.
South
Africa's long-standing tradition of patronalism, a feeling that personal
connections are necessary to get almost anything done, and thus feeding
distrust in the rule of law, should be neutralised in favour of meritocracy.
"This reliance on patrons cultivates deep personal connections among those
in one’s network, but it also spawns nepotism, reliance on bribes, and often
violence when trust breaks down". The country should now be taught how
those "in power” have repeatedly taken advantage of this situation to
create political machines that accumulate wealth and suppress opposition. This,
we labelled state capture.
Whilst there are now better integrity management mechanisms inside political parties, heightened sensitivity to abuse of state resources in favour of personal aggrandisement, "the country’s political class is still prone to corruption and the tendency to favour personal connections over democratic institutions" is still rife; it has taken a sophisticated private sector dimension.
Just
thinking... Let us unpack the three areas...
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