It is about political power and no more 'the struggle'.

Up until the EFF became the first opposition political party in South Africa to fill the FNB stadium, many people refused to believe that it is an alternative in the making, if not a new political force to reckon with. Notwithstanding warnings from ANC youth leaguers who were part of the Malema-as-President ANCYL that the delays in allowing the ANCYL conference to sit might result in stranded youth imagination being captured by the EFF, few in the ANC listened. When the EFF called for a 'South African Shut Down' of the economy on 20 March 2023 which was successful, mainstream media and the political commentator complex dismissed it to levels they almost declared it a non-event. The unexpected peaceful character the 'shut down' assumed irrespective of the intimidating rituals fearful states do in such situations, could only demonstrate that a new leader in society has emerged and can command the young and youthful better that any leader of his time. 

With no precedent to deal with an opposition to 'the establishment' or 'consensus political order' in conditions of legality, the governing party and 'The Establishment' has for a while been dismissing of the new force. Given the similarity of the ANC's in-party political rhetoric with that of the EFF, both of whom seem to be not in variance with what in-government ANC is implementing, membership cannibalisation has been easy, and the dice is loaded in favour of the EFF. Many ANC members find themselves in a state of political duality, nostalgically ANC and pragmatically EFF. A condition which might explain why in Metropolitan Municipalities the ANC polled the most wards but could not meet the 50+1 threshold because of the proportional vote. 

 

If the Local Government Elections, the National Shut Down, and the EFFull FNB Stadium are a measure of the growing EFF support, and the duality of nostalgia and pragmatism is real, voter response might well reflect a shift from being about 'the struggle' to being about who gets political power where. The misadventures of economic transformation which characterised the last thirty years of the ANC being a governing party have made thinking about an alternative to it  one of the most politically rational things to consider. The convenience of voter apathy as the reason for declining support is being challenged by a new wave of voter maturity informed by society's understanding of the relationship between their vote and a better life, or load-shedding. The logic of believing in the correctness of your policies outside the correctness of structural adjustments' you pursue in your formal mode of being government has been fractured by how society experiences that logic. For instance, it makes climatic change sense to move towards green energy, but dinner table nonsense to live in under intermittent load shedding conditions because of that sense.

 

The realism that has engulfed the governing party and the opposition complex that South is headed for a coalition government arrangement holds important implications for how political adversaries in our democratic order will treat each other. The rhetoric of labelling each other as enemies or similar will significantly decline in favour of who can do what for South Africa. The new struggle is for political power and, through it, the control of the resources distribution prowess of the state that comes with it. If there was any new dawn that Ramaphosa promised in 2019, it might be the ushering in of a coalition arrangement which strips political parties of dogmatic obligation to party positions in favour of the interests they will be representing and South Africa. Assumptions and claims to represent 'the people' and acting in the 'people's interest' will be fractured, and potentially forever. True representation of society might find acceleration in the 7th Parliament as the relevance of parties decline to foreground which leader or leadership cohort can deliver the liberation promise in the Constitution. 

 

The overall contours of political power and, by default, the democratic order have changed. What was considered universal in the liberation struggle parlance and immediate post-conflict governing conventions is fractured to the core as priorities of coalition partners will determine the cadence of societal change and transformation. The ideationally superior and  (financially) resourceful will be hegemonic. Small parties, as we have seen in Tshwane, Johannesburg, and elsewhere will assume a majority-of-power-influence' over 'majority-of-voter-support' parties. Smart personalities or funders of the 'majority-of-minorities' will henceforth determine who, as in the individual or person, will have the executive authority of the Republic vested in them. Through this authority, the ultimate selection of who should be considered to take charge of the judicial authority, unless the coalition arrangement revisits the process, will also be disciplined by the new influence. A new cadre deployment of a special (or sophisticated) type in ANC parlance. 

The stage for an autocracy of the cognitive elite (rented or otherwise) is set. The established networks of influence will disintegrate to form or join emerging ones. Contestation for political power will follow the rule of 'it takes an equally strong and resourced network to fight or dislodge an incumbent one'. The networks that will undergird coalition partners will be coordinated by sophisticated secret societies or 'tribes or ideological ethnicities' society will never influence. The growth and incidence of checks and balances, including the auditability index of political decisions, will recede into the background of secrecy as 'public' accountability undergoes redefinition. This will fundamentally alter the structure, operation, and consequence of politics, and ultimately state power, via its most active agency, the government, as the ultimate prize of politics. CUT!!!