This was published in the TimesLive 13 December 2024
As South Africa approaches its holiday season, there will be no holiday for the ANC. The year ends with one of its fiercely debated subjects, the disbandment of PECs in the two economically dominant provinces. Without the benefit of criteria used to generate the possibility of disbanding two of its strategically important provinces, Gauteng and KZN, it is clear that RSA is now at an either-or decision point on this matter. The stakes will be higher when the "who succeeds Ramaphosa as ANC President question is factored into the discussions. The ANC is now a site of succession politics and attendant contestations. Its soul will be the prize or casualty of the GP-KZN disbandment. Wrestling within its top leadership echelons is not a good sign of the stability required to complete its ambitious renewal program.
The established
convention is that the Deputy President is the heir to the ANC throne. The
convention is vulnerable to disruption, thus making the position of the ANC
President available to anyone who can mount a campaign. This makes provinces
that command numerical and hegemonic influences within the ANC sites of the
'who succeeds Ramaphosa' battle. All logic in the ANC might, until
16 December 2027, be filtered through its succession battles. The cadence of
the 2026 Municipal Election readiness of the ANC will reflect how dominant the contesting
groups or factions have become. The upcoming Regional Conferences of the ANC,
essentially the nodes of influence to determine municipal elections candidate
lists, as well as delegates to the muted 2025 National General Council, and the
finalisation of some Provincial Executive Committees will be an additional 52
sites of the succession battle.
The logic of acting on
provinces that did not perform in the immediate past elections and causing the
ANC to lose the right to form a government might be choked by which province
contributes to the in-ANC leadership contest. The dismal 17% and 19%
performances in the two provinces will not have the force to invoke sanction as
preparation for the next milestone, though logically legitimate. In the
strictest sense of analysis, the continuation of the two PECs means that the
same leadership, which yielded the current election outcome, is expected to
generate new and different outcomes.
Arguably, the MK Party
dynamic as an exogenous factor that affected the two disbandment-threatened
provinces is a good reason for poor performance. Still, it does not change the
loss of political power implications attached to it. At worst, it makes a
plausible argument to open a debate on why the MKP dynamic happened, a debate
that might question the entire leadership of the ANC. It might bring into the
centre the many unanswered questions mutedly entertained within the ANC and now
openly deliberated by the SACP, COSATU, and SANCO.
The disbandment
conversations are led by a post-election analysis framework, which will
recommend what non-performance deserves. In this whirlpool, the ANC has to deal
with its decisions to establish a Government of National Unity, some of which
have become political capital for the pending succession debate. The GNU
introduced the dynamic of sufficient consensus onto the political landscape and,
by default, a context of negotiating and renegotiating policy positions other
ANC administrations might have taken. The BELA Act is the immediate policy with
which the GNU commitments were stretch-tested. The logic of opposition to it,
which arguably might have persuaded President Ramaphosa to order a rethink of
the contested sections, survived the NEDLAC process. Only the ideological
posture towards the latest agreement is the new political capital necessary to
deflect the post-election analysis reports and the implications thereof.
The disbandment
discussion now permeates all other policy considerations. Where grand political
gains could have been made, the ANC had to settle for positions that left it compromised.
The logic of survival and succession might be dominant and suffocating the
political prowess that the ANC has historically been about. The latest
statement by the Deputy President, Paul Mashatile, that there will be no
disbandment should be understood in its proper context. His statement,
"Overall we didn’t do well as the ANC. As you know, we got 40%, so we don’t
want to blame KZN or Gauteng or any other province", is the cleanest
signal that the May 29 election performance is one of the criteria used to
decide on disbandment. In another comment, Gwede Mantashe retorted that the ANC
cannot take a decision and leave it unattended; if the decision is to be made,
it will have to wait for January.
Ownership of the
ultimate recommendation ‘to disband or not’ means ownership of the consequences
that will follow and domination of the discourse that would have engulfed the
ANC towards its subsequent elective conferences, including the 2027 ‘who
succeeds Ramaphosa one. The tug-of-war over who sanctions or stops the disbandment
is a key point of contention, a crucial decision that will shape the
inside-the-ANC political landscape. The shape of postures about renewal with or
without consequence management from within the leadership echelons has made
renewal so alien to members that they do not understand it and cannot defend
it. Parallel to the idea of a liberation
movement consequence management practice and system is the readiness of leaders
to embrace the consequences. As they say...Eish, the succession debate is with
us again!!
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