On its way to negotiating with the apartheid regime between 1985 and 1990, the ANC was already under pressure to seize the moral high ground of the struggle against apartheid rather than hope for a hard power type of advantage. The perceived triumph of the liberal order with the US as its node and the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, as well as the rise of 'verligtes' in the Afrikaner Nationalist Establishment, marked the existence of a vacuum of power which needed to be filled in South Africa without a need for an outright victor. The rise of liberalism, including its liberal right dosages, triggered increasingly complex systems and networks within the ANC and the global governance institutional setup, overshadowing the role of the collective in determining the destiny of the NDR and, by default, the ANC as its custodian.
Equally monumental as
this shift was the rise of the sovereign individual, propelled by Mandela as a
liberation icon and a node of concentrated moral high ground-based leadership
monopoly, the concept of collective leadership and democratic centralism would
be undermined. The first to pitch an idea to the influential individuals within
the ANC had the best chance of determining policy direction until a post facto
opportunity to review presented itself. The economic establishment effectively
uses a strategic gap to choke the potency of the ANC's economic transformation
policies at the altar of trickle-down monetary policy thinking.
A cadre of economic
correct thinking figures, organised as post-apartheid mandarins, somewhat
guided by the material realities of the geopolitical balance of forces,
occupied the economic transformation ideation breakaway rooms of ANC thinking.
This saw the resurgence of the pre-1949 ANCYL-inspired Programme of Action
elite consensus taking over the economic policy reigns of the ANC. This
environment, of which its essence was the start of the deteriorating power of
the consultative character of the ANC, made it easier for newcomers and
peacetime revolutionaries to acquire strategic power and influence. ANC,
including buying it.
The legitimate
preoccupation with the transfer of political power, which would otherwise have
happened given the apartheid state's readiness to surrender it as a condition
for economic power concessions, established economic transformation fault lines
the constitutional order was attuned to entrench as templates of economic
coexistence. The template was framed to package the economic authority of the
republic to vest in the proverbial market without interference by the state.
The political settlement made it clear that no elected government can call the
shots in economic policy as much as other governments did in the past (before
1994).
The renewal program is supposed to be analysed alongside these economic fault lines, the growing hollowness of political power that does not trigger an economic miracle. There's a glimmer of hope that this program could significantly
improve the deteriorating political situation in the country.
The reversal of the
ANC's decimated capacity to influence economic debates should form part of the
renewal process. The review of the role of ANC branches in policy determination
is a renewal matter. The reconfiguration of membership categories to manage
focused contributions to the ANC is long overdue; not every member wants to
attend branch meetings, yet they want to contribute. The electoral college must
be formalised and allowed to filter through criteria that it can proudly stand
up to and say are the things we are submitting to lead.
The ANC may be at its
organisational worst, but it is the better alternative to renewing RSA. The
need for this renewal is not just a suggestion but a vital necessity for the
future of South Africa. CUT!!
Agree that the Economy is the key, and therefore building economic capacity critical, along with how members participate. FPG
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