Until the suspension or
firing of Khumalo as the official leader of the MK Party, the party's true
character was shrouded in mystery. Zuma's move to position himself as the
party's linchpin starkly reflected the widespread dissatisfaction with
the post-NASREC 2017 renewal program. The MK Party, with its carefully chosen
name, symbols, and core constituency base, appears to be a potent weapon aimed
at the governing party in the 2024 national elections. The full extent of
its impact remains to be seen.
In
the post-1994 era, the ANC is at a pivotal crossroads, teetering
between a potentially catastrophic decline and a momentous shift towards a
brighter future. The party faces the daunting task of addressing internal
strife and rescuing the democratic movement from self-inflicted wounds. The
current coalition government scenario necessitates immediate, radical change
towards a genuine renewal of the ANC and a significant improvement in cadre behaviour.
The
ANC's strategic preparedness to counter the burgeoning opposition complex, a
variable seemingly worsened by one of its most prominent former leaders,
Jacob Zuma, tests the party's resilience. His unprecedented assault
on ANC support, particularly in Kwa-Zulu Natal, has been met with a form and
character of response from the ANC leadership that is worryingly mismeasured
and sub-strategic. The yet-to-be-explained or exposed funding or resourcing
architecture behind the MK Party, its readiness for all litigations, and
military precision propaganda machinery indicate a
long-orchestrated plan.
With its anti-ANC posture, the emergence of the MK Party has not only insulated it
from being a target but has also sparked excitement in the opposition rank and
file. The possibility of a less than 50% performance by the ANC has become a
real prospect, with three political parties led by the governing party's former
and significantly popular ANCYL President, Secretary General, and President.
The resilience of the ANC's election strategy is now being stretched to its
limits, and the resources deployed into the opposition complex are suddenly
being weaponised against the same order if the ANC's support is further thinned
to open up space for what they are against.
With
little evidence that the concentration of liberalism within the ANC is waning,
the race and protection of minorities vector of South Africa's liberalism
funders has complicated the purpose of reducing the governing party's support
to less than 50%. A coalition context would strip the political mandate of its
constituency accountability and introduce funders' interests as the new vector
of politics. To imagine an anti-Zuma sentiment translating into a pro-ANC one
to help intercept the land and radical economic transformation agenda returning
to the centre of politics seemed like a fantasy until the fateful December 16
announcement that Jacob Zuma would be the face of the MK Party.
The
ANC's election machinery and political juggernaut have always depended on its
heritage as a force multiplier, and other parties cannot abrogate themselves any portion thereof. The mere idea of freedom in South Africa and protection
of the cardinal freedoms of association, assembly, expression, and speech are
constructs associated with what the ANC has been to most voters. At best, their
discontent with the ANC is often displayed through abstaining rather than
voting it out. The opposition complex has been growing because of voter apathy;
for instance, in Tshwane, the ANC won the most wards but could not get the 50%
threshold to govern. The Zuma factor joins the Malema factor, eating on new and
youth voters he resonates with and depleting those who still vote for what the
ANC stands for.
The
MK heritage, its rituals, and endearment by a society that is faced with race-defined
inequalities is a strategic risk to the governing party complex. It is known that
struggle songs that mobilised youth and workers' bravery to fight apartheid
were compositions from MK camps and facilitated through the MK underground
structures to reach society. The propaganda machinery of the ANC was, for most
of its combative history, with the apartheid state etched on the MK enigma to
an otherwise misplaced adrenaline of South Africa's black youth. The smash and
grabbing of this heritage is a stroke of genius and was unanticipated by the
ANC establishment and caretakers of the movement, who are clearly not the
establishment.
The
truth is that the ANC faces not only the Zuma-Magashule-Malema complex of insider-inspired
opposition but multiple liberal order proxy groups, and the comprehensive costs
of fighting this election on all fronts are becoming too high. The moral high
ground which compensated it has been (self) liquidated by investigation reports
on corruption and state capture, the trust deficit with RSA's economic
establishment, mistrust by the global liberal orders nexus of western
countries, and service delivery dysfunctions such as electricity and water
shedding.
What
is to be done
A
casual diagnosis of what has pushed Zuma this far is the loss of legacy and
marginalisation from what he considers his political home. Second to his
surname as something to defend, including through the Samsonian method of
pulling down the pillars and dying with everyone, is his ANC legacy or the ANC
itself. This is a unique opportunity to be seized and broker a 'save-the-ANC'
beyond the incumbent's program. The in-ANC divisions and palace wars have little
if anything, to do with its policies but more to do with the geopolitical,
business, and personal interests of those nodes of the conflict. By creating voter-defined
and vote-counting quantified political capital, Zuma will demand a ceasefire
from the invisible to society snippers assigned to finish his fragile legacy.
The effortless manner in which the MK leader, Khumalo, was allegedly purchased
or captured indicates what is inside the party as a grievance. This opening
creates space for a merger of MK back into the ANC. CUT!!!
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