The greater battle is about to begin

Catastrophe theory elucidates the inherent vulnerabilities of any system, be it political or otherwise. A system can abruptly spiral into chaos, surprise, or derailment, a culmination of various factors. South Africa's post-election process is a striking example, grappling with an unforeseen context where a political party, not even a blip on the projected power matrix, has catapulted into the limelight. The MK Party, initially dismissed as a non-factor, has defied all expectations and is now a pivotal player in potential coalition arrangements. This development underscores the unpredictability of politics. 

 

A political system, or democratic order, is characteristically unstable. It can reach a breaking point, a convergence of unrelated crises, if not carefully maintained. The structural challenges, often overlooked but forming the bedrock of RSA history, can have far-reaching and unpredictable outcomes. This fact underscores the gravity of the situation we find ourselves in, helping the reader grasp the complexities and uncertainties of the South African political landscape.

 

The emergence of identity politics, a phenomenon that gained momentum after the 'Polokwane Putsch' aftermath, has solidified Jacob Zuma's position as a leadership node in his home province and cultural base, following in the footsteps of Prince Buthelezi and King Zwelithini. On 16 December 2024, when Zuma announced his affiliation with the MK Party, of which he is now the leader, the battle lines with what he terms 'the ANC of Ramaphosa' were drawn. This marked the onset of a credibility crisis for the ANC with Zuma's traditional and established constituencies, creating palpable tension in the political landscape. This clarification helps the reader understand the shifting political dynamics in South Africa. 

 

The election results settled the first score in a more significant battle in the ANC Complex. It is a known secret that Ramaphosa has been the weakest ANC President since 1994. He is sustained by, amongst others, what the ANC fears will happen to the economy and the proverbial rand if they remove him, besides him being a formidable leader personally. There is also a manufactured narrative that Ramaphosa is more popular than the ANC. If the narrative is true, that popularity has not worked for the ANC in 2019, 2021, and dismally in 2024. This makes him popular as a head of state through a derived majority; he is a choice of all parties, including the 40% in the ANC. These challenges underscore the gravity of the situation and the uphill battle that President Ramaphosa faces if he remains the ANC candidate for the 7^th administration presidency. 

 

After a consequential election, the true battle will be the translation of the 64% pre-split original ANC votes to realign forces to deliver on the liberation struggle promises it made pre-1994. This battle will find expression in several ways, first in the demands of the MK Party and EFF to enter into a coalition with the ANC. Second, in Jacob Zuma's replying affidavit in the pending disciplinary hearing, he will answer the charges of characterising the ANC as a Ramaphosa one. Third will be the response of KZN as a new MK-dominated government to the Ingonyama Trust Land policy advances the national government has been making. Fourth, during the 2024 postmortem ANC NEC discussions, we will discuss how to prepare for the 2026 local government elections. The sixth and turbulent expression will come when the succession battles for the ANC Presidency start at sub-national levels. 

 

Besides the above, the policy divisions within the ANC about the privatisation of State-Owned Entities through unbundling the network industries of energy, water, and logistics will be a terrain of tensions the democratic order would have to deal with. Policy divisions of the ANC which define the splits that caused the monumental loss of absolute majority, will characterise in-ANC battles until the following national and provincial elections. Along the orbit of the economic transformation of South Africa lies structural impediments created by the political accord which preceded the political settlement of 1994. 

 

Regardless of the course, the ANC pursues after this loss; the unfolding political change will likely facilitate a quickened process to fracture the templates of economic domination. Voter sentiment has already shifted the balance of power between large, established political parties and smaller, nimbler new entrants. The balance of power in South African politics has shifted in favour of the African Nationalist Movement that emerged from the 1912 Nationalist movement establishment by the Pixley Ka Isaka Seme and Reverend Dube cohort at a speed never before witnessed, post 1994.

 

The 2024 election voter choices have engineered a moment similar to the whites-only 1909 National Convention, which created the Union of South Africa, the 1955 Congress of the People in Kliptown, which yielded the Freedom Charter, and the pre-1994 Convention for a Democratic South Africa. Notwithstanding his discontent with Jacob Zuma, the person he has again burst open the opportunity to review and reclaim the legally established liberation space guaranteed in the Constitution. The Polokwane opening to engineer a review of the CODESA settlement as a dividend of his ascendance to the presidency was not used. 

 

Whilst it is plausible for stalwarts like President Mbeki to enter the leadership vacuum space, it is essential to balance it with younger leaders to ensure that the beyond Mbeki issues are weaved into any outcome of the dialogues South Africa is lured into. The thirty years between CODESA and the Political Party's pilgrimages to Stellenbosch and Brenthurst boasts content from practice that must guide us on how not to mess up the democratic order at the altar of self-aggrandisement and legacy-searching safaris. Instead, South Africa should understand its tendencies and biases to respond to the political environment. The monied should be cautioned to stop buying their ideas through a political elite that does not care what happens beyond their gated communities. The election results, which reflect a deep rebellion inside what is arguably still the nexus of South African political life, the ANC, will diminish compared to the actual convulsions in society. Remember, the most experienced juggernaut in the manufacturing of ungovernability is wounded.

 

Much of what the economic establishment, which is overtly active in the battle to suppress what needs to be untied as knots choking the developmental potential of South Africa, knows about the issues is proving to be wrong. This wrongness has filtered into the political space, where political parties fail to understand their constituencies, save for pre-1994 ones. The less-spoken-about truth is that the historically franchised constituencies have been voting consistently for some time. The DA and VF have together shared that 100% of voters. In constituency representation terms, they have the absolute mandate to represent. Only African Nationalism is orphaned.

 

The depth of disruption the MK Party did to the planned party of consolidating the establishment is, in the true sense of the word, a consolidation of the discontent the vile of which we only saw and airbrushed in July 2021. In joining MK, President Zuma invoked the quote, ‘There comes a time in the life of a (nation) where the choice is to surrender and fight'. This was the statement made when the original MK was formed. Zuma said they chose to fight, and their fight was not to be with guns but their vote. This they did with distinction. They burst into the centre and should thus be respected for the capability displayed. 

 

In disruption, as a nation, we need to learn at the pace of change, be open to challenging and shifting our mindset and biases and be open to new experiences and experiments that push us out of our comfort zone. The ANC, in its current corporate form, stripped off its MK orientation and tendencies, the youth exuberance Malema took to the EFF, and the small and nimble parties claiming to represent black people can no longer claim to be the authentic voice of 'the proverbial people'. Whoever can demonstrate to be that voice is the one who will lead the new battles in South Africa's unnecessary war with itself. The unpredictability we find ourselves in is not short of maverick expertise. 

 

The fragile ensemble that has suddenly lurched into a developing elections credibility chaos, voter sentiment surprises, or anticipated coalition government derailment without any of us having anticipated it, as a result of an accumulation of factors we ignored or airbrushed, is with us. Unmanaged, it is a catastrophe. CUT!!!