The edited version was published in TimesLive on 28th September 2024
The DA is factually removed as the face or head of the capital city's executive authority. The tyranny of no absolute majority power has reared its head again in Tshwane. The power interregnum will last as long as the political bickering for who should lead continues. With the GNU configurations, expectations of the DA must-go coalitions, and the real need for the political stability of the capital city, the outcome of the new coalition negotiations might yield completely unexpected permutations of who ultimately governs Tshwane.
It is not a secret that
the NEC harboured some discomforts about this specific regime change in
Tshwane. Previous attempts at taking over the administration of Tshwane from
the DA, including the failed Section 139 intervention, were pre-GNU indications
of the Gauteng Provincial Government's deep-seated discontent with political
power configurations in the Capital City.
The contest governing
the capital city has gained momentum with the two pre-GNU nodes and sworn
political adversaries, the ANC and DA. To the DA, which regards its occupation
of the Capital City's mayoral seat as a symbolic and hegemonic victory, leading
the city has always been an opportunity to showcase its government capability
to Africa's largest concentration of diplomats. Tshwane would have added Cape
Town and the Western Cape as flagship jurisdictions, demonstrating its
governance prowess at any level.
To the ANC, and acutely
the Gauteng PEC, which sees the continued government of Tshwane by the DA as a
symbol of the tyranny of being governed by a majority of minorities while you
command a large majority. The loss of hegemony over the Capital City would
always evoke emotions of a symbolic loss of political power in any political
power contestation. The last of the fortresses in any contest, including war as
the ultimate, is the Capital City. Failure to control it as a jurisdiction signifies
a path towards defeat. Compounding this, and lately, is how this has violated
the GNU principle that the party with the majority of votes forms a government.
Leading Tshwane is an opportunity for the ANC to reclaim the political power it
lost in the 2024 national elections.
With a collapsed DA-led
coalition and a new Tshwane-dominated governing coalition emerging,
notwithstanding the reality of a GNU arrangement firmament, what comes next is
a logical question. The pending decision of who should be the next mayor raises
questions about the issues the ANC NEC should factor into its decision
grid.
Firstly, Tshwane is the
executive capital city of South Africa. It hosts the most significant number of
embassies and consulates than any other city in the continent. It is the potential seat of any African Consensus on global matters if this potential
were to be explored by the political establishment. The governance of Tshwane
should, at its worst, be the best that Africa can display to the world. This
requires the city's political and administrative leadership to understand the
sophisticated character of Pretoria's role in the global scheme of
things.
The elephant-sized
question in the room is to what extent the would-be replacement of the DA Mayor
meets the grossly unattended city responsibility to be the lifestyle host of
RSA hegemony over international relations. If the NEC desires regime change,
strategic consideration of who it deploys is obligatory without the
Thoko-Didisation of the 2026 local government elections.
In the emerging
political circumstances, the 'no Sputla, no Vote' movement will be
opportunistically grabbed by the MK Party, which is lying in wait to scavenge casualties
of a battle for the leadership of Tshwane within the ANC.
Secondly, if the inputs
of former President Mbeki at the Gauteng breakaway session to consider renewal
options where he was brazen in decrying the absence of leadership required in
the ANC to manage new complex governance situations like being a Mayor of
Africa's leading economy's Capital City, were to be taken to a logical
conclusion. In that case, changing the mayoral chains in Tshwane requires a
reconfigured leader of society brigade commensurate with what the provincial
leadership advanced it will be working on.
Allegations of collusion
between the water tanks mafias, the construction mafias, and other sorts of
extortion syndicates with the regional political centre of the ANC should be
followed up, investigated, disproved, and debunked as a commitment to demonstrate
the ANC NEC's seriousness about the restoration of the ANC's integrity with
Tshwane voters. The conversations inside the taxis and buses every morning, at
funerals after burials, and many other non-organised community gatherings,
including churches, should be managed after the regime change decision. The
bigger question is, who then will take on the Mayoral Chains?
Thirdly, the financial
viability of the city, which is an outcome of a multiyear mix of economic
decisions that hallowed out the fiscal capacity of the city to breathe beyond
its operational budgets, is a risk the ANC should take with a clear view of how
it will explain current resource-constraints-based service delivery failures,
come 2026. Any further decline of the ANC in South Africa's metropoles will only bode well for its possible recovery in 2029 if it enters into an election
pact to survive the total loss of power with current and future GNU
partners.
The difficult-to-airbrush
reality of a city bureaucracy transitioning from being deployed to being
commissioned into the service of "we the people" is a strategic
consideration that the ANC NEC should consider in dealing with this matter.
Tshwane society is aware of the true nature of the city's leadership
and management challenges. People want water, lights, and the bread of the ANC.
Fourthly, the difficult-to-airbrush MK Party reality as a strategic node for building an alternative,
however correct or otherwise, remains a threat the ANC should manage. It would
have been politically prudent for the regime change decision, if indeed it was
urgent and necessary, to have been preceded by a consultative process with key
stakeholders within the ANC's complex of allies and complementary
contemporaries such as organised business, organised faith-based organisations,
and its veteran's community. Given who becomes the Mayor interregnum, insights
from consultations can still be factored into the decision grid.
After dealing with the
above, the ANC should consider returning to the centre its earlier
decision to treat the leadership of Metropolitan Municipalities as a National
Executive Committee matter. It was correct to make the appointment of Metro
Mayors a NEC competence. What might have been a challenge was to ignore the
centrality of defining criteria to do that. At worst, the Mayors of
Metropolitan Municipalities must have ex-officio status in the PEC, NEC, and
REC. Even if being REC members would be a political advantage,
they shouldn't necessarily be elected REC members, should competence and
capability exist at that level. What should be mandatory is for the REC
leadership to be in charge of the whippery and speakership of the Metro.
The mandate to govern
belongs to the ANC as a whole, and the wholeness of its skill set must be
factored across the spheres of government. The executive authority of the local
state should start preoccupying the decision grid of the ANC. The lost
political power started to erode first in local government, and Gauteng is
accused number one in the dock if the ANC were to conduct a true trial of what
happened here.
Governing a city as
diverse and cosmopolitan as Tshwane requires multi-frame thinking that goes
beyond narrow regional party preferences and myopic leadership ambitions and
embraces instead the pursuit of national interests in how the capital city is
governed. Tshwane must be the city where the best experience of what South
Africa is capable of being should be showcased. It is different from the specific
buildings in the town that are national security key points; every street and
person in TSHWANE must be a national reputation security key point. Poorly
managed, a Tshwane broader than a political party-type
coalition must be considered. The service delivery convulsions in the city,
most of which are borne out of the challenges in politics, are sufficient to
justify the NEC's direct involvement. The exiting of Brink and the GNU
statement of intent introduces the local government dimension of the GNU where
it matters. CUT!!!
Comments
Post a Comment