The C-Suite is an instrument of foreign policy.

Published in the BusinessDay of 23 April 2025 

The ensemble that the tariff wars have lurched global trade into chaos might have rewritten how smart democracies should deal with geopolitics. The new foreign policy theorems of transactional international relations are starting to procure private C-suites as the global trade-facing brigades for countries to define trade and diplomatic ties. The appointment of Mcebisi Jonas as one of the comprehensive C-suite is, in conceptual terms, one of a string of innovative interventions by President Cyril Ramaphosa, highlighting the crucial role of the private sector in shaping international trade.  

There may be challenges or personality deficiencies. Still, getting those at the touchpoints where it matters in geopolitics and international trade should be welcomed. In any event, the G20 conversations and trade protocols that will be signed at the ultimate summit are currently in the domain of private sector C-suites from different democracies. Special envoys from various G20 countries have landed on our shores, and the transaction-intensive G20 negotiations are yielding new and multilaterally beneficial responses to the new geopolitical order. 

 

The rise of trade-centric international relations, a result of countries' growing appetite for markets, is rewriting the diplomatic playbook. This new normative framework is based on the bottom-line considerations that guide private sector decision-making. Power is no longer solely about a nation's self-perception and national identity, but also about its position in the trade balance with other nations. The global pecking order is increasingly determined by productivity and trade indices, making hard power less relevant.  

 

One of the dividends of a globalised world and value chain-driven international trade is that corporations have increasingly become both the objects and instruments of foreign policy. Consider the protection and promotion of national sovereignty and constitutional order, the well-being, safety, and prosperity of citizens, and a better world and Africa as part of the strategic canvas of South African corporations in how they interact with their counterparts, while being bottom-line facing. Taken to its logical conclusion, the national and bottom-line convergence of interests, driven by skin-in-the-game-inspired C-suites, will yield better international trade transactions than deep-state or otherwise bureaucrats incentivised by gladiatorial geopolitical considerations, offering hope for the future of trade negotiations. 

 

The dualisation of international relations and cooperation through the infusion of private sector C-suites in the representative architecture of diplomats is long overdue in South Africa. Given the ownership demographics in the economy, those feeling the pinch of the tariff wars, on both sides of the country, tensions would be better suited to transact as they renegotiate trading protocols. South Africa should not forget that it was only when its political settlement started to make business sense that it found the required traction. The ping-pong tariffs between the US and China increase and decrease are driven by market pragmatism rather than the political whims of the competing geopolitical context. 

 

It is inarguable that individual corporate actors, whose interests do not always align with those of their governments because they often possess an informational advantage over the public sector, drive critical trade variables such as unit price determination. Given that price is an expression of all value inputs in a product, including national pride, geopolitical positioning, and market reconfigurations, C-suites conclude transactions with a level of sophistication scarcely found in the public sector. 

 

The Trump administration, with all its discontents, has opened up the veil of where true international relations happen: the corporate boardrooms. It is the brazen way that Trump has made international agreements that amount to deal-making conducted in the proverbial city hall. The public service function is upended in global trade and cooperation. State capability is extended, potentially without the permission of public service authorities and scholars. 

 

Although the Mcebisi Jonas appointment is not new, given that President Ramaphosa served in the Commonwealth Business Council while he was in his 'proverbial deployment', it is a resurgence of RSA and significantly new political establishment c-suite influence on international trade and cooperation. This time, it is open. It is an opportunity to mainstream what various trading associations have been operating outside of, into the national economic transformation dialogue. 

 

For the RSA government, establishing regular consultations with the private sector, providing financial support for industry expertise, and enhancing economic intelligence would be constructive initial steps. More fundamentally, policymakers must pledge to adopt a significantly different mindset regarding the private sector. The domains of influence are naturally separate. In a context where meritorious public service commissioning is gaining traction, templates for cadre deployment are fracturing, and coalition governments are becoming a growing reality, the Mcebisi appointment phenomenon may be redefining the politics of deep state configuration. 

 

Once more, necessity spurred pragmatism. The President Ramaphosa leadership cohort responded more to posterity than to the exigencies of the now. It would be prudent to take the same approach to mending the fragile RSA-Israeli relations. A Special Envoy from the private sector should be deployed now, as US-RSA relations are a dimension of the RSA-Israeli relations.