It is the character of political power which is the issue.

This was published in TimesLive 07 May 2025

The prize of politics, including liberation politics, is state power through government. Post-liberation Africa has been unable to integrate liberation objectives with state power. Fortunately for South Africa, the political settlement was anchored on the liberation promise being part of the new democratic and constitutional order. Equally pressuring the context was the pursuit of freedom by those who opposed equality, non-racialism, democracy, social justice, economic justice, and human rights. 

Aside from the promises of liberation, the fundamental currency of anti-apartheid and anti-colonial politics, the interests of power brokers emerged as the new central currency of politics. In politics, accumulating social and political capital is essential, as transactional business or commercial capital relies on stability. As the significance and attractiveness of political and social capital become confined to the columns and rows of the general ledger of political and state power, the nature of political power gets reconfigured. This is often outside the purview of those who have made politics a vocation of choice. 

 

South Africa has access to political power through representative democracy. Political parties hold the most significant sway because it is through them that individuals can become players in the political arena. To mitigate the risk of majoritarianism, the constitutional order established a threshold of 50 plus 1 to attain absolute governance power. If no political party meets this threshold, a coalition arrangement, inherently involving profound power-sharing elements, will reshape the nature of political power. The May 2024 Moment has transformed South African political power's form, content, and character. 

 

The promise of liberation—that no government rightly holds authority without the people's collective will—has taken on an entirely new significance. Although the people continue their governance mission, they have redefined the power structure. Within their minority enclaves at the margins, they have made political power in the RSA reliant on lobbyists and funders for its functionality. Political power is, as a result, diffused.

 

Recent reports of unrest within the ANC's Parliamentary caucus and the ANC NEC highlight the nature of political power at issue. A simple number crunching exercise would yield a pedestrian answer: the ANC can ditch the DA and form a new majority government or continue with a minority government dependent on confidence and supply. It is not that simple but more complex than many would appreciate.

 

It is essential to recognise that the ANC is still searching for an ideological true north, which extends beyond the liberal constitutional framework adopted during the 50th ANC Conference in Mafikeng. The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) serves as a guiding star with a defined set of goals, and achieving these goals relies more on strategy and tactics than rigid ideological principles. This ideological flexibility has rendered its key strategic choices, such as potential alliances, susceptible to tactical manoeuvring rather than being firmly grounded in ideological beliefs. 

 

The ANC adopted the GNU mode through a detailed Statement of Intent (SOI). It has always been assumed that the SOI was thoroughly discussed within its structures, especially its NEC, NWC, and the tripartite alliance. Typically, a Special General Council would facilitate the final consultations in line with the ANC's democratic principles. Nevertheless, the SOI referenced the South African Constitution of 1996 as the foundational policy document for the GNU. This decision shaped the nature of the political power that the GNU was reconfiguring. This begs the question about the depth of awareness of the implications of configuring power in that way.

Since 1996, following the Constituent Assembly's 1994 vote to draft a Constitution, South Africa has not had, except for commitments made by MPS and Cabinet Ministers, a commitment to the Constitution as profound as that observed during 'GNU 2.0' configured. The ANC, as a political party, despite its losses at the Constitutional Court, has, through SOI, committed to "building a democratic state guided by a progressive Constitution and a system of institutions that aim to translate the values of the Constitution into practice." 

The SOI lists 10 principles requiring a radical shift from a one-party government to power sharing. The political mandate drift resulting from the convergence of election manifestos means every major government policy decision will be subjected to these principles. The origins of these decisions can be traced back to the 1996 Constitution, implying that anyone who has not adhered to its principles would be deemed a constitutional delinquent. The constitutional order has delegated the judiciary's responsibility of interpreting the Constitution. Consequently, disputes arising from the GNU arrangement will establish legal precedents that the liberation movement seems unprepared to engage with. 

Considering the 2025 Budget versions 1.0 and 2.0, and the potential collapse of 3.0, it is evident that the National Treasury or the Minister has violated principles seven and eight of the fundamental principles. It is not a secret that the financial models employed by the National Treasury to guide the fiscal framework have long lacked transparency, accountability, and effective community participation. The rapid withdrawal from the VAT increase from 2% to 0,5% and then to 0% indicates that if the decision was based on evidence, that evidence was either significantly exaggerated or ignorable. 

The GNU's modalities, outlined in the SOI, have transformed the framework of political power in South Africa since the adoption of the first Constitution in 1910. South Africa is a power-sharing test site based on sufficient consensus principles. This requires a partnership recognising the power of minority partners, particularly those whose unique confidence in supply can drive the proverbial policy and implementation needles. 

The constitutional history of South Africa is closely tied to its political economy, emphasising the need for stability, certainty, and investor confidence. Although the different constitutions arose from the specific political contexts in which they were negotiated, the recurring theme has been the system's stability in favour of the markets. The private sector is the most influential driver of economic growth and development in a slightly over nine trillion economy, where the state manages less than 2,5 trillion. Thus, the degree of investment by the private sector, like political power, in South Africa will determine how active the state government is as an agent. 

 

The pending conversation within the ANC about the GNU would require an accurate and vintage ANC analysis of the balance of forces. The tools of analysis that have sustained the ANC through greater difficulties would need to be deployed in the conversation. While it is true that the DA has a full grasp of the depth of weakness the ANC finds itself in, an ill-considered decision to exit the GNU when the narrative momentum is not in favour of the ANC might consolidate both the traditional DA-led and the new MKP-led opposition complexes. 

The future of South Africa is coalition governments. The intensity of this reality will be exponential after the 2026 local government elections. The ANC should stay in class and learn to survive the new reality. Throwing political tantrums at an experienced coalition government party like the DA might be the shortest route to the abdication of an otherwise historically earned social and political capital that requires a new breed of political sophistication. 

Having volunteered itself into constitutionalism as a new terrain of political engagement, the ANC should know that the citizen is defined in that world, and the concept of 'our people' does not exist; instead, 'we the people' opens the preamble. In the vortex of power contestation, the ANC finds itself, and as the biggest of all other small parties, what is real is an environment where it has become far easier for newcomers, read DA, MKP and ActionSA, including those with toxic ideas, to wrestle political power. 

The figment of still being powerful works for spin doctoring. What is real is that the (40%) power the ANC has today is more constrained than in its (50% plus) past. The current hold on power is far less secure, and its tenure is shorter. It will be essential to characterise the political power that all contest for; the answer lies in how to enter the battle. History lessons will not bring back lost power; the new voter is a futurist in outlook. CUT.